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Introduction 
 “In a region beset with chronic and widespread problems, ranging from poor governance, war, violent 
extremism, and resource scarcity, one threat stands above the rest in terms of potential for destruction 
and cost in opportunity: the use of sectarianism as a geopolitical weapon. Sectarianism encourages 
extremist rhetoric and violence and serves to distract a populations from economic and social concerns 
by providing a convenient enemy on which to focus.”1 This quote by the Soufan group, a strategic 
security consulting group, displays an opinion that is shared by mainstream media across the globe. The 
Middle East has apparently fallen into a state of religious extremism where violent sectarianism is every 
day’s business. Current day Syria seems to be the focal point of all this sectarian violence. Bashar al-
Assad himself however, has never really voiced his concerns on sectarianism. Moreover, Assad claimed 
in 2011 that "Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people. 
This is the core issue. When there is divergence you will have this vacuum that creates disturbances."2 
Two months after this interview was published people were dying in the streets of Damascus while 
crying out for someone who would actually listen to them.                                                                  v 
   Bashar al-Assad is still president in Syria. On July 26th 2015, after about a year of silence, Assad 
gave a gripping and belligerent speech about the strength and unity the Syrian people have shown and 
how the real Syria will never fall. While thanking the Iranian, Russian, Chinese and Lebanese fighters 
for their backing and dedication, Assad said: "Syria's victory is for all Syrians against the plots hatched 
against them (…) the homeland, Syria, is our right, the protection of Syria is our duty and God stands 
with right"3 In a roar, his supporters answered with the now well known “With our soul, our blood, we 
sacrifice for you oh Bashar!"4.                         v 
 Claiming the existence of a ‘real’ Syria implies the existence of a fake counterpart. Although he 
doesn’t explicitly name Syria’s enemies, one of the currently major destabilising and militant factors 
within Syria’s geopolitical borders is Islamic State5. Mainstream western media outlets have been 
covering the Syrian conflict non-stop, while especially focussing on Islamic State itself. This focus has 
created a new evil. After the Taliban and Al-Qaida, Islamic State is the new face of terrorism.6 And 
rather than an invisible group somewhere in the mountains, it has proclaimed a state of its own. Islamic 
State is a visible and distinct geographic entity. Maps are drawn and urban battlefields sketched out. In 
every way, Islamic state has become the prime example of sectarian violence and whether it is here to 
                                                     
1 The Soufan Group. "the Greatest Threat in the Middle East." http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-greatest-threat-in-the-middle-
east/  (accessed 02/23, 2016). 
2 Solomon, Jar & Spindle, Bill.,. "Syria Strongman: Time for 'Reform'." The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011. 
3 Al-Ibrahim, Mohammad A.,. "President Al-Assad's July 26th 2015 
Speech." http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1454:president-al-assad-s-july-26th-2015-
speech&catid=319&Itemid=496 (accessed 02/23, 2016). 
4 Ibidem 
5 Islamic state is known under various acronyms including, but not limited to “ISIL” (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), ISIS (Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria), Daish or Daesh (acronyms of its Arabic name “ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām”). For clarity, this 
paper will make use of its unabbreviated form “Islamic State”. – Zelin, Aaron Y.,. "The War between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of 
the Global Jihadist Movement." The Washington Institute for Near East policy. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-
war-between-isis-and-al-qaeda-for-supremacy-of-the-global-jihadist (accessed 23/02, 2016).  
6 Ibidem 
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stay or not, the Middle East has once again gained an extra layer to its already complicated modern 
history.  
 The Syrian conflict however, is no longer a mere regional conflict and by no means reflects just 
a sectarianist divide. Therefore, it seems ignorant to call this conflict a sectarian civil war. However, the 
societal schism that has occurred cannot be denied either. This paper aims to discover in what way 
Syria’s society has been divided and whether it is correct to call this conflict sectarian.  
 It is important to objectively identify all the forces at play and the core of this conflict. How 
should we identify this civil war? Are we talking about a sectarian conflict or are we talking about a 
political conflict with sectarian influences? How should sectarianism and sectarian violence be defined 
in general? In order to find an answer to all of these questions this paper will be guided by a comparison. 
Sectarianism is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East. In academia, Syria’s neighbour Lebanon is 
still the prime example of a sectarian division of society. A division that has known a gruelling civil war 
fuelled by sectarian discontent, sectarian violence and foreign interference. All factors that we van 
perceive in Syria today. The Lebanese 1975-1990 civil war then, is the perfect guideline to help identify 
what sectarianism and sectarian conflict does look like. These two case studies together will guide this 
paper towards an answer to the main question of “To what extend can the ongoing Syrian civil war be 
identified as a sectarian conflict compared to the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990?”.                v 
  By definition, a comparative research design like this “entails the comparison of two or more 
cases in order to illuminate existing theory or generate theoretical insights as a result of contrasting 
findings uncovered through comparison”.7 This means that besides the two case studies Lebanon and 
Syria, theory is required to guide these case studies. These three aspects will form the three main parts 
of this paper. In part one, the main ideas concerning sectarianism, sectarian violence and the way 
sectarianism is manifested and mobilized within society will be addressed. Using Peter Berger’s model 
for Sectarianist groups and Collier & Hoeffler’s theoretical model for civil war this part describes the 
theory behind this paper. Part two will demonstrate why the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990 is such a 
good example by specifically displaying how the theory from chapter one is exhibited ‘on the ground’. 
Finally, this paper will try and use the knowledge gained in the previous parts to explain if and why the 
Syrian conflict can be seen as sectarian in nature.  
 Within the academic community the Lebanese civil war has been researched extensively. The 
research done has provided a clear and coherent view of the struggles that face a population as divided 
as theirs. On Syria however, academics are just starting to find out how the recent explosion of violence 
has come to be. Although there is no lack of sources and research on the (post-)colonial legacies Syria 
has had to deal with, anything written before the conflict is merely showing an authoritarian Assad 
regime in a rather modern country. It had its serious issues, but a civil war was not in the books. This 
thesis aims to add to the existing research, by providing a picture of what sectarianism in the current 
                                                     
7 Bryman, Alan.,. Social Research Methods - 4th Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 710 
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conflict looks like and how it is manifested. The answer this research produces not only helps to identify 
the underlying problem in Syria, but it also paves the way for other research to continue and expand on 
the drawn conclusions.                                                               a  
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Part 1 – Theories & Methods 
Sectarianism is a concept that has been applied to many groups of religious fanatics in the past. Today 
we mostly see it occur in literature on the Middle East. In order to understand how we can decide upon 
the possible sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict, one first needs to understand the concept itself. The 
oxford dictionary describes sectarianism as “Excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, 
especially in religion”8. In other words, sectarianism is a more than necessary sympathetic feeling or 
fondness for a specified philosophical or political group. What sets sects aside from other religious 
subgroups is the ‘excessive attachment’ part. It implies a more extremist perspective. Sectarianism then, 
seems an umbrella concept used to describe groups deemed extreme by the one using it. It classifies 
people or groups of people into different categories, namely into religious or extremist classes. In this 
context, it seems to imply a bigoted, narrow-minded and discriminatory nature towards another group 
of conflicting ideology, different ethnic identity or social class often manifested in a fanatical sense.9  
Sectarianism can refer to a political division within a society too. For example, one could 
describe the American Republican and Democratic Party as manifestations of American sectarianism. 
This however, is a rather rare use of the term and will usually specifically be referred to as political 
sectarianism, opposed to the regular religious sectarianism.10  
 From an academic perspective sectarianism is almost exclusively used as a referral towards 
religious beliefs. But, as common a term as it is, it is rarely defined. Especially in literature regarding 
the Middle East, sectarianism is a logical concept that people tend to understand without explanation. It 
has something to do with Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and the ‘fact’ that they don’t get along. As easy as 
most authors tend to get away with it however, this paper tries to go beyond a common-sense 
understanding of sectarianism. Higgins & Brewer, leading researchers on sectarianism in Northern-
Ireland present sectarianism in the most objective way: “the determination of actions, attitudes and 
practices by practices about religious difference, which results in them invoked as the boundary marker 
to represent social stratification and conflict. It thus refers to a whole cluster of ideas, beliefs, myths 
and demonology about religious difference which are used to make religion a social marker, to assign 
different attributes to various religious groups and to make derogatory remarks about others.”11 So, 
sectarianism is the way groups of people with a specific conviction feel about other groups of people 
with different convictions and how they react to each other with a prejudiced attitude, which 
encompasses everything from ideas to actions.                         v 
  Based on the previously provided definitions it seems clear that although it could be used as a 
term for politics, sectarianism is almost exclusively used to describe a religious group of people with 
                                                     
8 Oxford Dictionaries. "Sectarianism - Definition of Sectarianism in English from the Oxford 
Dictionary." http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/sectarianism (accessed 03/16, 2016). 
9 Kingston, Paul W. T.,. "Reproducing Sectarianism Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Post-war Lebanon." State 
University of New York Press. p. 21-24 
10 Ibidem 
11 Higgins, G. and John D. Brewer.,. "The Roots of Sectarianism in Northern Ireland." p. 2 
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more than religious claims. This view is reinforced when we talk about sectarian violence. Sectarian 
violence is, logically, a violent crime committed by sects. Searching for violence of sectarian nature 
however yields just religious conflicts. This shows that, as political as a sect may have turned, sectarian 
violence is always grounded in fanatical religious believes. Additionally, this also means that while 
sectarian conflict can turn into a civil war, a civil war does not have to be sectarian.  
   
§1.1 Peter Berger’s Sectarianism in Sociology 
If we are to research the possibility of a sectarian nature to the Syrian conflict, we need to have some 
method of proving sectarianism in a group. In this case Peter Berger has provided a sociological model 
to do exactly so. As has been noted before, sectarianism in academic literature is mainly regarded as a 
religious phenomenon. In sociology too, sectarianism is almost exclusively referred to as the religious 
isolation of a group of people, meaning that, although these religious groups can have political ambition, 
religion is always the basis on which these groups of people fall back. Peter Berger, a famous 
interpretivist sociologist, adds to this conception. As he puts it in his renowned article on American 
sectarianism: “the study of sectarianism is of wider contemporary interest than might seem at first 
glance. (…) In the modern scene we find the dynamics of sectarianism at work in places far removed 
from religion proper – in politics, art, literature, and even within sacred precincts of science itself.”12 
In other words, although sects have their roots in religion, it does not mean that other parts of society 
can be the dominant attitude for a sect.  
In his research, Berger has proposed a qualitative research method of researching sects. His goal 
was to not only identify a certain Christian group as a sect but also to identify what kind of religious 
sect he was dealing with. Berger focussed on American Christian sects, but he also explains how this 
model might be applicable not only outside of the United States, but also outside of Christianity itself.13 
Berger further argues that every sect, no matter how mild or extreme, has to have a system of meaning.14 
The validity of a sect, according to Berger, is dependent on how complex this system of meaning is, 
ranging from extreme primitivism to extreme sophistication. He identifies two aspects that are pivotal 
in assessing if and how a group of people can be called a sect or sectarian in nature. The first aspect we 
need, is what Berger, based on the Lund school of theology, has called the ‘religious motif’.15 This motif 
entails the form of religious experience and the patterns of a religious group and how these are 
fundamental to both the history and the current functioning of the group.  According to Berger, if you 
understand the history of a groups’ motif, you can induce whether something is sectarian in nature, are 
merely a pious group of people.16    
                                                     
12 Berger, Peter L. "The Sociological Study of Sectarianism." Social Research 51, no. 1 (1984). p. 367  
13 Idem, 380 - 385 
14 Ibidem 
15 Idem, 378 
16 Ibidem 
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The second aspect is what Berger calls ‘attitude’.17 Attitude is what truly sets apart sects not 
only from other pious members of a church, but also from other sects. As Berger puts it: “The attitude 
towards the world largely determines the inner social structure of the sect”18. This attitude is important, 
because it determines how a sect makes sense of the world around it and it is the way in which a sect 
establishes itself to carry out the mission it believes in. To determine the attitude of a sect one needs to 
understand a sects system of meaning. This system is not set in stone. According to Berger, a sect 
generally knows two phases. First, there is a phase in which the sect discovers itself, in which the 
emphasis lies on social pressure rather than a religious one. The second phase happens when a sect 
becomes more routinized. This is where a sect hardens into a more ecclesiastical form where pressure 
is more religiously focussed, rather than social. In both cases however, a sect needs a different ‘reality’ 
from someone who is not in that sect. Berger sees this as a different mode of experience and atmosphere 
which is completely different from a non-religious experience. Berger does not define it much further, 
but interpretively the reality, or atmosphere is not very hard to point out in a religious group. Although 
both phases in a sects system of meaning are part of the attitude, it is the second phase in which its 
system of meaning is the easiest to dissect. To do this, one has to look at how a sect tries to attain ‘peace 
of mind’, ‘peace of soul’, or whatever ultimate state it tries to achieve. To check this, Berger has defined 
nine categories: Conversion, Catholicity, and Authority, Gnosis, Salvation, Community, Eschatology, 
Apologetic and ‘Seelsorge’.19  
Conversion in a sectarian means the “passing from one level of experience and perspective to 
another that is totally new and different”20. In other words, when one first converts to the sects set of 
believes that person would experience a world that is completely different from what they experienced 
before they joined. Berger argues that while this is a characteristic of every religious experience, the 
sectarian experience is characterized by its ‘violent difference’. 
Catholicism means exactly what the word implies: universality. A sectarian meaning system 
needs a claim on universal validity. According to Berger, something can only be a sect if the groups 
believes seek to interpret the universe in its totality and to explain everything we experience.21 Outside 
of this universal system, is only ‘darkness and error’ and should be condemned.  
Authority kind of speaks for itself. The meaning system of a sect, and with that the sect itself, 
claims authority over all of its subjects and these subjects should not listen to anyone but the sect. Berger 
argues that the Latin phrase of ‘Extra ecclesiam nulla salus’, or, ‘there is no salvation outside of the 
church’, is the best description of the kind of authority a sect should hold over its members.22 Not 
adhering to its authority means rebellion and consequently punishments like excommunication or death.  
                                                     
17 Idem, 380 
18 Ibidem  
19 Idem, 382-385 
20 Idem, 382 
21 Idem, 383 
22 Ibidem 
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Gnosis is the idea of a superior cognition. If someone completely surrenders their body and 
mind to the sects meaning system that person will gain a new perspective on things or possess a new 
reality. Berger states that the Gnosis part of the meaning system creates an “epistemological elite”23 that 
have been able to open their eyes to the actual truth, rather than what they thought was truth before. 
Berger makes in interesting notion in this stating that it is an interesting characteristic of a sect that if 
someone from the outside shows understanding of what he calls the ‘gnostic corpus’ but does not adhere 
to it, the sects reacts defensively and usually states that the outsider is ignorant to the fundamentals of 
the sects faith. A sects gnosis is meant as more of a secret perspective of truth.  
Salvation is the ultimate goal of every sect. Without some kind of salvation, whether this is 
through heaven or through personal enlightenment, we cannot speak of a sect. Salvation truly is the 
meaning of what a sect member does in life. Salvation is easy to grab, but only if you adhere to the sects 
way of interpreting it.  
Community is the factor of a meaning system which states that a sect cannot exist with only one 
member. Although it is open to most changes, it is also one of the screws that keeps the sect together. A 
sense of community unites and even preaches to its people. 
Eschatology is the historical destiny a sect claims. Eschatology can be displayed as something 
mystic or extraordinary that has occurred in the past and the sect is a continuation of that historic 
happening. On the other end, eschatology can also mean that the sect works towards an historic event 
that, in their perspective, surely will happen. An example of this would be ‘Judgement Day’ as it is 
defined in Islam or Christianity.  
The Apologetic characteristic of a sects system of meaning show how a sectarian movement will 
and should always defend every argument made against it and how it incorporates every fact. Added to 
this is an answer to why other religious believes exist and why they are wrong, even if they claim 
something similar to the movements own believes. Berger argues that although not every sectarian 
movement might be good at this, it is the drive or intention to execute it that counts, not how successful 
they are in their arguments.  
Seelsorge, or spiritual welfare, is the way a sectarian movement deals with critical or difficult 
questions from within the own movement. Berger calls this characteristic a “theory of doubt and a 
mechanism for dealing with doubt”24. Every sect is supposed to have a mechanism that deals with doubt 
on the sects teachings. Berger states that there is no set way to deal with it, but without dealing with 
doubt and its implications, a sect will breakdown since doubt will break the isolation of the meaning a 
sect gives to life. It paves the way for other (heretic) interpretations. 
 Of course, this is an interpretivist model and thusly it will always be an abstraction from reality. 
However, Berger’s model has been used to identify a lot off Christian sects in the United States during 
the troublesome years there and has proven to be a solid backing. It is therefore also not surprising that 
                                                     
23 Ibidem 
24 Idem, 385 
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the model has been used by a large variety of scholars. Berger’s model for interpreting a religious group 
provides a qualitative theory that can help differentiate between fighting groups in the Syrian conflict.  
 
§1.2 Collier & Hoeffler’s Greed and Grievance in Civil War 
According the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2014 has known more wars 
and more violence than any year since 2000.25 With a few exceptions here and there, almost every 
conflict in the list has been internal. SIPRI argues that this rise in violence is especially due to the rise 
of Islamic State and the increase in sectarian violence in Syria overall.26 This shows once again, that 
understanding civil war and the reasons why it happens are extremely important.  
 Academics have been trying to get a grip on exactly what causes civil war and what factors 
should be prioritized over others for a while. Over the last decade this debate has been dominated by a 
discussion on how civil war is caused by ‘greed’ or by ‘grievance’.27 Greed in this sense means the 
desire to better yourself as a group socio-economically while grievance is meant as a sentiment of a 
group in which it feels like injustice has been done to them. This could be economically, but usually 
grievance refers to ethnic, religious or geological injustice. While this debate is as fruitless as the ‘nature-
nurture’ debate in biology, in the sense that not one answer is correct, both sides have developed useful 
theories on how civil wars are caused and what factors can help identify a possible civil war in the future. 
The model that instigated this debate was created by Collier & Hoeffler and still provides the best 
answers concerning both the greed and grievance argument.  
 Collier & Hoeffler were the first to try and model how greed and grievance play the major parts 
in civil war. In their article “Greed and grievance in civil war”, they propose an econometric model, 
better known as the CH-model, which tries to predict civil conflict.28 By using a dataset of 79 civil wars, 
they have tried to explain how and why these civil wars were initiated. The main hypothesis of their 
research was that rebellion in a civil war is untenable if the rebelling side does not have the funds. 
Ideology or non-financial inequality is, according to their hypothesis, not enough to start a civil war, 
unless the differences among the population are enormous. In other words, while objective greed might 
cause and maintain a civil war, objective grievance will not be enough to achieve the same. A big focal 
point of their research is aimed towards the costs of starting and the upkeep of a rebellion. Measuring 
this against the economic welfare and position of the people in a country, combined with political 
equality results in a figure which describes the likelihood of civil war. Next, they relate their numbers 
to what they call the opportunity model.29 This model explains how significant a change there is of 
actually developing an opportunity for civil war. This model measures the level of education, commodity 
                                                     
25 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.,. Sipri Yearbook 2015 : Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. 
26 Idem, 6 
27 Mitkov, Zlatin. "Civil War After the Arab Spring: A Comparative Study of Lybia, Syria and Yemen."Central European University, 2015. 
p. 11-19 
28 Collier, Paul., Hoeffler, Anke., World Bank., Development Research Group.,. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Washington, DC: World 
Bank, Development Research Group, 2000. 
29 Idem, 573 
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exports, GDP, GDP growth, the duration of the current peace, geological (dis)advantages, and 
population values, like the amount of people, social fractualization, dispersion and the size and influence 
of the diaspora. The combination of these models, as is apparent in appendix 1, results in significant 
values for economic opportunities (also called the greed variables), while the more grievance oriented 
factors like ethnic/religious tension seem less important. Collier & Hoeffler also provide us with a list 
of criteria that are essential in ‘measuring’ a civil war, as can be found in the footnotes30. In short, Collier 
& Hoeffler found that although rebellion can always happen, a full civil war can only take place if the 
opportunity for organization and finance is right.  
 If we assess this model qualitatively, which will be its use concerning the Syrian civil war, we 
have to make a distinction between the Greed and the Grievance factors. The grievance factors in this 
model are called ‘ethnic and religious hatred’, ‘political repression’, ‘political exclusion’ and ‘economic 
inequality’. If we look at these categories a little closer, the factors this paper has to look out for are self- 
determination; religious, political and ethnic diversity; ethnic cleansing/genocide; wealth disparities; 
economic insecurity; unemployment and lack of opportunity; displacement/Internally displaced persons, 
or IDPs; Predominance of one ethnic group (85%) and lastly weak states. Analysing these factors for 
both Lebanon and Syria will show how a sectarian conflict like the Lebanese civil war compares to the 
current conflict in Syria. Are there indeed a lot of similarities, or is there something else going on in 
Syria? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
30 GDP, Level of secondary schooling of boys, Population Density, Social Cohesion, Primary commodities, Military advantage (measured by 
mountainous terrain, population dispersion, social fractionalization), ethnic hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic 
inequality.  
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Part 2 – Case study 1: Lebanon 
In the 1950’s, the Middle East was the centre of mainstream media. The newly founded state of Israel 
and its neighbours were fighting and the world’s hegemonic powers were divided on what to do. The 
countries surrounding the Palestine region were facing severe political upheavals and, due to 
nationalisation laws in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, entrepreneurs took their business and with that a formerly 
flourishing part of the economy with them.31 One capital city however, opened up and welcomed 
investors and political exiles alike, with open arms. Beirut, ‘The Paris of the Middle East’ served as “an 
economic and cultural bridge between the West and the Middle East”32. Apart from its location, Lebanon 
seemed to be different in every aspect of daily life from its bordering countries or its fellow Arabs 
throughout the entire Middle East. Free expression, freedom of press, a highly capitalist economy and a 
high ranking university were combined with flashy nightclubs, top-notch casino’s and luxurious hotels. 
Or as Thomas Friedman put it: “every region of the globe needs one city where the rules don’t apply, 
where sin is the norm, and where money can buy everything or anyone”.33 Beirut was that city in the 
Middle East. 
 Under the surface however, not all was fine and dandy. The Lebanese political system worked 
in two ways: While it repressed extreme diversifying opinions from developing, it also prevented 
sentiments, warnings and disagreements from being resolved.34 These brewing troubles, combined with 
political change, led to a brutal and deadly civil war of fifteen years until the fine sectarian balance was 
once again restored. Beirut itself however, has never been the same. 
 In order to provide some answers this chapter will consist of three parts. First, it will try and 
demonstrate how sectarianism is rooted within the Lebanese society by giving a small overview of its 
history. This chapter will try and shed a light on how Lebanon has both failed and succeeded in balancing 
a widely divided country. Lebanon’s recent turbulent history is a legacy inherited from its early history, 
the remains of the Ottoman Empire and the former colonial powers. In order to better understand how 
sectarianism plays a role in Lebanon and its history, one first has to assess that history. Analysing this 
history leads to questions like “how has sectarianism defined Lebanese history?” and “How has 
sectarianism influenced and determined the, what I would like to call, balance of power among the 
various separate groups in the country?” However, Lebanon’s history of sectarianism can be traced back 
to the early Middle Ages and runs through Lebanon’s past up until today.35 While certainly interesting, 
analysing all of it would defy the point of this case study. This case study serves as a control study, 
showing how sectarianism and sectarian civil war show up in Berger’s and Collier’s & Hoeffler’s model. 
Therefore, Lebanon’s sectarian history will only be analysed on points that have proven to be relevant 
                                                     
31 Cleveland, William L., Bunton, Martin P.,. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2009. p. 332-337 
32 Idem, 333 
33 Friedman, Thomas L., Mazal Holocaust Collection.,. From Beirut to Jerusalem 1989., p. 216 
34 Cleveland, 332-337 
35 Reilly, James A.,. "Ottoman Beirut: Crisis, History, and Sectarian Memory." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East 31, no. 1 (2011): 164-171. 
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to the civil war from 1975. The issues that arose in the build-up to this bloody conflict cannot be analysed 
per group, since they have been intertwined since the beginning. Therefore, it makes more sense to shed 
light on Lebanon’s sectarian history as whole rather than as fragmented groups. After establishing 
Lebanon’s sectarian past the last two chapters of this part will demonstrate how Berger and Collier & 
Hoeffler would assess the Lebanese civil war.                       d 
 
Chapter 1 – The Fighting Sects of Lebanon 
It is impossible to pinpoint the exact moment where sectarian violence in Lebanon started. The history 
of the fighting forces goes back to the early beginnings of their respective religions itself. It is probably 
around the change from the fourth to the fifth century A.D. where the first important stepping stone for 
Lebanon’s societal divide can be found. It is this period, where a then unknown Syriac Christian monk 
and his followers founded a new religious community.36 The Maronite Church as it is now known, 
became a rapidly expanding Christian subgroup. Early medieval times were harsh for the Maronites 
since their radical monothelitic take on Christianity was seen as heresy by the Orthodox Church, as 
defined during the Third Council of Constantinople in 680.37 Maronites nevertheless, were not 
specifically named in the documents following the council. This has to do with the Arab and Islamic 
rule they were brought under from the 630’s and onwards. The harshly ruling Muslims persecuted and 
attacked Maronites, which caused a slow immigration from current day Syria to the Lebanese 
mountains.38 From here, Maronites attacked and raided Islamic forces, sponsored by Emperor 
Constantine IV. Ever since, Maronites and Muslims have found themselves in a delicate coexistence. 
The Maronites, shunned by the other religions in the region focussed themselves on artisan trades where 
other religious groups in the region wouldn’t want to preside over.39 Especially in the trade in, and 
processing of silk was in hands of the Maronites. This focus caused a stable income and grow of 
population until at the start of the twentieth century the Maronites comprised the main share of 
Lebanon’s population.  
  In the early eleventh century however, a new sect appeared in the Levant. As odd as Maronites 
where to Christianity a couple of hundred years before, the Druze where a religious anomaly to not only 
(Levantine) Islam, but to the Abrahamic religions in general. The Druze religion started off as a 
subgroup within the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam, spread out over the entire Levant, but most prominent 
in Syria and Lebanon. Heavily influenced by Greek philosophy and ancient traditions, the Druze turned 
into a closed religious group where no converts were allowed.40 Straying farther and farther away from 
the Muslim faith, the Druze soon found themselves in a position where they had to defend themselves. 
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The Druze developed into a force to be reckoned with. Though not big in numbers, the Druze managed 
to hold off and raid the crusaders during the Crusader rule of Syria.41 Their fierce fighting brought them 
prestige and authority with the Sunni caliphs who were still ruling the lands. Their command over the 
Beirut port made for a Druze focus towards the Lebanese city and its countryside. Following the 
Christian occupation however, the Mamelukes focussed on eradicating everything non-Sunni within 
Islam, including the once useful Druze. After severe fighting, the Druze were pushed to the background 
and forbidden from practising their religion in public.42 
 The history of Lebanon is characterized by violence and rebellion. Either between the Maronite 
and Druze minorities or between one those groups and their rulers. Throughout Traboulsi’s book it 
becomes clear that there has not been a century since the arrival of the Druze where there has not been 
at least one civil war. According to him, especially the Ottomans had a hard time controlling the 
Lebanese territories because of five ways in which they had divided the region combined with the 
already ingrained tribal and religious separations.43 The first division is due to the millet system. This 
religious divide created a hierarchy system where a superior Muslim ruled over an inferior ‘protected’ 
community made up of people following the other Abrahamic religions. Although Christians and Jews 
were not being persecuted, they had to pay jizya among other regulations, causing very apparent 
distinctions between the two groups. According to Traboulsi it is this system that pushed the Lebanese 
Christians and Jews into peasantry and artisan trades, while the Druze picked up a tribal-warrior outlook 
on life, causing political and sectarian inequality and unrest.                                      e 
The second cause of division can be found in the division was a power relation one.44 The Ottomans, or 
their chosen governors in the provinces, bestowed titles upon important families and clans in the region 
(referred to as the manasib class), distinguishing them from the other common folk, also referred to the 
‘amma. The ‘amma however consisted not only of poor people, but also of rich traders and 
manufacturers. Nonetheless, the holders of iqta’ (also called iltizam), or muqata’ji families as they were 
called, were the only ones to enjoy enormous benefits. Not only socially and financially, but also 
concerning their political power. Important to note here is that the muqata’ji families were always Druze 
families. Unsurprisingly, clashes between these classes happened throughout the ottoman period.                                         
 It is within the ruling elite however, where Traboulsi identifies a third set cause of conflict.45 
Local rulers, whether Turkish or a local war chief, did not see eye to eye with the central government in 
Istanbul. Because of the benefits they enjoyed, these political leaders usually managed to enrich 
themselves, gather a following and try to continue without Ottoman support. Often encouraged by 
European support, especially in the Maronite rebellions, these uprisings caused a great deal of conflict 
and damage in the already heavily separated region.  
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Next, much like the Ottoman political rulers, the muqata’ji families also quarrelled among themselves 
for the best benefits.46 Some economic or social assets were better than others and if you couldn’t get 
these by way of bribing Ottoman officials, physical conflict was the other resolution. The last reason for 
rebellion Traboulsi describes is guided by the landlord-peasant relationship between the muqata’ji 
families and their leases to the ‘amma, which caused many violent peasant revolts.47 
 Although the muqata’ji system formally fell at the end of the 19th century, the Druze still 
consider the leaders of these ancient families to be their leaders. These divisions all played a part in the 
Lebanese 1975-1990 civil war. However, the biggest issue was the different occupations of the religious 
minorities. The Druze had established themselves as great warlords and the Maronites where skilled 
tradesmen and artisans. These specialized endeavours meant that, outside of religious ideals, their 
respective populations also rarely mixed. They kept their separate villages and towns, and in big cities 
like Beirut they had their own quarters. The Sunni and Shi’a population, understandably, went the same 
way. Especially Beirut turned into an unintentional segregated city.48 When Lebanon as a state first 
received a constitution in 1926, these sectarian differences became apparent on paper too. This 
constitution, which still forms the basis for the Lebanese constitution today, is, according to Traboulsi 
a hybrid one: “on a republican body, emphasising individual rights and liberties and political and 
judicial equality were grafted articles concerning communal rights and [sectarian] representation.”49 A 
few of the most important of these articles for the new sectarian republic are article 9, 10 and 95. These 
articles are still in effect today and have barely changed since 1926. They show the importance of 
legislation on the subject because before this constitution, sects were allowed to do as they saw fit. 
Depending on who ruled the area one could be punished. Or not.  
Article 9 states that every religious community is granted the freedom of expressing their religious 
values as long as it doesn’t result in violence and that “the personal status and religious interests of the 
population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.”50 This is not very different from other 
constitutions, but it is an important step against discrimination and repression. Article 10, on freedom 
of education, is however more of a limited freedom: “Education is free insofar as it is not contrary to 
public order and morals and does not interfere with the dignity of any of the religions or creeds. There 
shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow 
the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction.”51 Article 95 however, is an especially 
rare article when it comes to constitutions. It shows how the consociationalist system Lebanon has today 
was already in place back then. The article, among other divisions, states that administrative and 
government positions must be equally distributed among Christians and Muslims (and no-one else), no 
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matter how they are represented parliamentary. So, if for example Christians would secure 95% of the 
parliamentary seats, the government positions still need to be divided equally. Since deputies were to be 
popularly elected along sectarian lines, the elections always resulted in the same division: the President 
was a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the Chamber of 
Deputies a Shia Muslim. The French were confident that because of the Christian majority52 in the state 
a Muslim would never become its President. However, when in 1932 the Sunni Sheikh Muhammad al-
Jisr announced his candidacy, while Maronite Emile Iddi withdrew from the race, High Commissioner 
Ponsot suspended the constitution and dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, showing just how fragile the 
Lebanese state still was. 
 After a series of put-down rebellions instigated by the Sunni population in the 1930’s to force 
annexation with Syria, the Second World War brought renewed talks of independence, concluded by 
the 1943 ‘National Pact’.53 This pact contained a set of principles that should guide the country towards 
smooth coexistence.  
  The first major principle was the distribution of power in politics.54 They agreed on a parliament 
that consisted of 55 seats. 30 for the Christians and 25 for the Muslims in which the primary positions 
would be divided as they had traditionally been. So, the President should always be Maronite, the Prime 
Minister always a Sunni and the speaker of parliament should always be Shi’ite.55 The second and third 
principle helped to deal with the complex position Lebanon was in. On the one hand they could not 
ignore their Arab identity, but on the other hand they could also not ignore the strong western influence 
in the region. Therefore, as an addition to article 1 of the Lebanese constitution,56 they added a definition 
of Lebanon as a “country with an Arab profile that assimilates all that is beneficial and useful in Western 
civilisation”57. In other words, the Arabs and Muslims would not seek annexation with Syria or any 
other Arab country. Premier Suhl proved he meant to keep his promise only a year later when, as one of 
the founding members, Suhl headed the Lebanese delegation that would sign the Alexandria Protocol, 
the basis for what would become the Arab League. In this document he put a special clause which stated 
that Lebanon had to be respected as an independent and sovereign Arab state by every member. In 
exchange the Maronites had to accept an Arab identity of Lebanon. They were to never seek foreign 
help or intervention and promised that “Lebanon shall not be a base or a passageway for colonialism”58. 
Lastly, Maronite President Khuri and Sunni Prime Minister Suhl agreed to work closely together in 
running the state so Muslims would have more influence on power than they had had before. To commit 
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to this promise, Khuri agreed to favour Muslims at the expense of Maronites in the sectarian quota’s 
concerning the positions in the administration or the government.59 As positive as the ‘National Pact’ 
seemed, it was not made official or incorporated in the new constitution of 1943. This left an already 
difficult to govern country with two different governing texts and many of the conflicts to come could 
be ascribed to different interpretations or priorities in these texts. Indeed, the Maronite Presidents used 
different interpretations mostly to enrich themselves and their allies, while the Sunni premiers mostly 
sought out an increase in power.60 These parliamentary problems were enhanced when, after Israel’s 
war for independence, the young Lebanese state was flooded with fleeing Palestinians. The Lebanese 
government turned out to be incapable of properly dealing with the humanitarian crisis. The fact that 
these refugees were Muslims caused several rifts within parliament among Maronites and Sunni’s. 
Tensions kept building and every couple of years major rebellions and strikes would be instigated by 
disgruntled Druze, Maronite or Sunni people. When a solution would be found, undoubtedly another 
group would feel left out, causing a repeat of problems over and over again. In 1975, after skirmishes 
between the extreme right Maronite Phalange party and the Palestinian PLO, Beirut, and soon to follow 
the entire country, was at war with itself.  
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Chapter 2 – Sectarianism in Lebanon Defined 
This paper, but academia in general, has bombarded the Lebanese civil war to the stereotypical 
manifestation of sectarianism and sectarian violence. However, in claiming that this civil war was 
sectarian, the participating groups need to be sectarian in nature. Since this is the goal for the Syrian 
conflict, it is important to first establish whether Berger’s model indeed functions. Does it actually help 
identifying a sectarian group? Therefore, this chapter will be dedicated to proving exactly that. By using 
groups generally considered sectarian, Berger’s model as explained in Part one should provide answers.  
 The Palestinian Sunni forces, and the several other Sunni and Shi’a combinations of militia’s 
have fought a lot in the Lebanese war. There are however some problems with calling them sectarian. 
As explained in part 1, sects can only occur as a splinter group of a main religious stream and should 
therefore always be a religious minority. While the main stream is of course Islam, calling the Sunni’s 
or the Shi’ites small minorities would be ignorant towards the believes of both groups. Worldwide, over 
a billion Sunni’s and more than 200 million Shi’ites make up the vast majority of Muslim believers. 
Defining these overarching groups as sectarian makes little sense, since they in themselves are made up 
of a varying group of sects and other non-sectarian but religiously guided groups. This chapter merely 
tries to be a proof of concept for Berger’s model and is not seeking to make new arguments concerning 
the Sunni versus Shi’a debate. Sunni and Shi’a violence in Lebanon is religious violence combined with 
the military actions of the Maronites and the Druze. Within the country, the Sunni’s, and especially the 
Shi’ites are minorities, which does explain their portrayal as sectarian. However, in light of the Lebanese 
civil war what should be clear is that whether you define a Sunni or Shi’a fighter as a sect member or 
not, they fight for a religious cause with other groups who might indeed be called sects over the same 
issues.  
 To shortly recap Berger’s idea: a group with a sectarian nature consists of two important aspects; 
a religious motif and an attitude which contains a system of meaning. This chapter will analyse the three 
main sectarian groups: the Maronites, the Druze and the Sunni’s and the Shi’ites combined. What should 
be noted however, is that while these three main divisions do constitute for most of the fighting, several 
different groups fought under the same flag. This means that while one group fighting for the Druze 
might be strongly sectarian in nature, a different one might be very loosely tied to sectarian roots. This 
chapter will analyse the broader ideas behind the Maronite and Druze. As explained in part 1, Berger 
has shown that although sectarian groups are always religiously based, they can be politically active in 
varying degrees. The same goes for the different groups fighting for one major religious stream. 
Although some are more religiously involved and some are more focussed on politics, all of them are 
fighting under their groups sectarian flag.  
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§3.1 Maronites 
The Maronites are probably the group that has played the most important part in Lebanon’s divisionary 
history. As we have seen in chapter 1 they were one of the first established religious groups to colonise 
the Mount Lebanon region. But, sociologically speaking, what is their religious motif? The motif is the 
red line that has guided a group throughout its history. It is the glue that binds current day group members 
to those of the earliest days. For the Maronites this history dates back to the fifth century. Originally 
Maronites were a Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) group that converted to the Roman Catholic Church at the 
end of the sixteenth century. Little is known about the period before however. Those thousand years 
have a few sources which mention Maronites, but their own writings have not been found. What has set 
their religion apart from both these two main stream Christian faiths however, is the monothelitistic 
approach of this group. This is also the most common reason for Maronites to be named in sources 
before the 1500s. Although much can be said about the theology on this subject, for this paper it will 
suffice to say that monothelitism is a Christian believe where Jesus Christ has two natures (Human and 
Divine) but only one will (mostly divine but it is influenced by Jesus’ human nature) in contrast to the 
Catholic and Orthodox two wills of Jesus Christ which work together. From the Third Council of 
Constantinople in 680 monothelitism was considered heresy. The Maronites specifically were not yet 
mentioned during the Council, but several claims have been made in the following centuries concerning 
their heresy. It brought the Maronites in a place where they had to defend themselves physically from 
the Muslims, but theologically from the rest of the Christian faith. It is this motif that sets Maronites 
apart from other Christians and made them seek refuge in the Lebanese mountains. 
 With their motif defined the need arises to analyse the Maronite system of meaning. As 
explained before, a sects system of meaning is defined by nine categories, which al must be present to 
a religious group. This does not mean it cannot be weak, but all nine categories are adamant if we want 
to call a group a sect. Conversion in the Maronite group is not very apparent, but its different level of 
experience comes mostly from the way the church is structured. From early on, Maronites have believed 
that the Church is responsible for the spiritual and moral side of life, while politics is does not have to 
meddle in this. Politics should defend the Churches subjects, but above all else they have to guard the 
church members’ equality and it is in this very aspect where we also see the ‘violent difference’ as 
described by Berger.61 Every member of the Maronite Church is seen as equal, no matter how wealthy 
they are or what their race was. A Maronite is called upon to establish a society of freedom, justice and 
equality based on dignity and equal opportunity for all.62 This equality was rare in especially medieval 
times, but has only recently become a generally accepted idea.  
 Maronite Catholicism is very similar to the claims of mainstream Catholic or Orthodox 
Christianity. It believes God, with Jesus Christ as his human embodiment, has created all that is and all 
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that will be. God is the universe and through this the Maronites claim universality in their faith. The 
same can be said for the Gnosis part of the Maronite system of meaning. The superior cognition or 
perspective that is claimed by mainstream Christian faith is reflected among the Maronites and they 
work towards a very similar form of Salvation as well. If we move to the Eschatology of the Maronites, 
a similar picture is painted. Just like the ultimate salvation is similar to main Christian faith, Maronites 
believe they move towards Judgement Day. The main difference however, is that while the mainstream 
faiths believe Judgement Day brings the kingdom and the city of God, Maronites believe they have to 
build the city of god before Judgement Day.  
The Apologetic and Seelsorge characteristics are very flexible with Maronites. This is probably 
due to the fact that they have been balancing their faith on the edge of heresy. Usually, both are quite 
similar to mainstream Christians unless they talk about their monothelitistic background. Over the 
centuries however, this fact has been less and less important to for example Catholic believes, which 
has also seen a decrease in questions concerning their religious motifs.   
 In contrast to both Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, the Maronites do have a different take 
on Authority. While their faith does influence all of their decisions and forms their moral compass, 
Maronites see the authority of their religion mostly as a spiritual authority and not so much politically. 
Consequently, its Community is also different. Rather than a strictly hierarchal system as these 
mainstream faiths have, Maronites believe that although they choose a patriarch, he is only the 
representation of the community in a system where they are obligated to have a leader.63 The Maronite 
Church is the spokesperson, but not the embodiment of the community. Important to note however, is 
that while Maronites have historically seen themselves as different from other Christians, they have 
often sought allies among other Christians, as is evident in their connection to the French. Number wise, 
over 3 million Maronites are known today of which the vast majority lives in Lebanon. 
 To Conclude the Maronites, it is safe to say that they have a place in every category within 
Berger’s system of meaning and a clearly different religious motif from other Christian groups. It is 
mainly their motif that has set them apart and has caused them to live a more reclusive and sectarian 
lifestyle. Although they have similarities to the mainstream Christian faiths, especially concerning the 
salvation and the gnosis, there are big differences, mostly concerning the way they want to build a 
community or how they want to live their lives.  
 
§3.2 Druze 
The religious motif for the Druze is more complex than any other religious group in this paper. 
Originally, the Druze started out as a branch of Twelver Shi’ism which mostly reflects in their originally 
west-Asian ethnicity. Describing Druze religion as Shi’ism however is wrong. The faith is highly 
syncretistic and contains elements of Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and convictions of ancient Greek 
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philosophers like Plato and Socrates. The diversity of influences has accumulated to a mystic and 
difficult to comprehend religion. According to the Druze, God has no attributes because God, in its 
essence, is everything and therefor also all attributes. Everything you see, you experience and can 
perceive is God. Since he is everything and nothing at the same time, God is also incomprehensible, 
immanent and transcendent at the same time. However, God has been reincarnated on earth several times 
and has done so quite often in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his descendants along Ali’s line.  
To Druze Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, as he has last appeared, was the god that had manifested himself 
seven times before. To them Al-Hakim was not just a prophet, he was God himself. Not only God 
reincarnates, however, but humans as well. Contrary to Hinduism of Buddhism, humans can only 
reincarnate into new human bodies of the same sex. However, it happened the second your previous 
body dies. The body in this sense is nothing more than a shell for the eternal soul. Teachings by prophets 
and religious leaders, holy books and other scriptures are symbolic and allegorical and mainly meant for 
the intellectual elite of the community and only after rigorous learning you can grow through the three 
layers of meaning ascribed to these symbolic teachings64. To add to the scriptures, the Druze have seven 
pillars: Truthfulness - love of the truth; Fellowship - take care of one another; Abandoning false beliefs; 
Avoidance of confusion - avoid evil; Accept divine unity in humanity; Acceptance of all al-Hakim's 
acts; Submission in accordance to al-Hakim's will 65 
 The Druze motif as explained above is far from complete, but complete enough to understand 
its position among the religions of the Middle East and to further analyse it’s sectarian nature. This belief 
system is the red line that runs through Druze faith until this day. Its attitude, as defined by Berger is, 
unsurprisingly also quite different. Starting off once more with the Conversion category, it is clear to 
see how the religious experience differs from other religions. Practising the Druze religion means a very 
philosophical experience where every aspect of life can be analysed. Its focus on intellectual 
interpretations of the teachings and its drive towards enlightenment gave the Druze an extremely 
different religious experience.  
 The Catholicism of the Druze is undoubtedly clear. Where most Abrahamic religions claim a 
universal God, the Druze claim that God does not only see everything as an entity, but it is everything. 
There is no more universality than claiming that God is everything around you. This claim immediately 
reflects the Gnosis of the Druze system of meaning. If there is such a thing as Berger’s “epistemological 
elite”66 it can be found among the Druze. To them, the truth can only be sought in a way that is different 
to most other religious convictions. Through study and surrender to God, you can achieve enlightenment 
that not only allows you your superior cognition over others, but it makes you understand the universe. 
Their gnosis also becomes apparent in the third of their pillars: Abandoning false beliefs. Achieving the 
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highest form of enlightenment is Salvation although heaven to the Druze is the state of ultimate 
happiness where you are so enlightened you will meet the creator.67 
 The Authority this group claims over its subjects is in line with its universality. Denying Gods 
universality means denying the soul of the Druze people and thus, there is ‘no salvation outside of the 
church’. Concerning its Community it is safe to say that the Druze following of about 2 million people 
(with have of the people in Lebanon and Syria) shows it is thriving, although not as much as they 
historically have. The care they have to show for their fellow believers is shown in the second pillar of 
the Druze faith.  
 The apologetic characteristic is harder to find out. What has been shown however, by Dana, is 
that the Druze, who have been attacked and persecuted regularly, have claimed to be an Islamic sect in 
nature and have claimed that although they claim Islam in a different way, it is still Islam.68 Connected 
to this, is a heavy focus on why they are right, rather than talking about why others are wrong. In the 
end however, the Druze have always been very secluded when it comes to their religion and it is 
forbidden to convert people to the Druze faith. This becomes especially clear in the Druze custom of 
taqiyya which they inherited from their Shi’a history. So although the apologetic characteristics are 
there, they are not extremely strong, since the Druze believe they have nothing to defend. This reflects 
a little on the Seelsorge. Dealing with doubt means dealing with evil. If you doubt the universality of 
god and with it the Druze religion, you have given into evil and should go see a religious leader.  
 The Druze are a very clear sect, even without the help of Berger’s system. But, as explained 
before, it needs to have a religious system of meaning but especially a clear religious motif to separate 
a sect from other pious groups. The Druze motif shows its extreme difference from other groups and 
affirms its sectarian nature. The Druze attitude can be explained in the same terminology. It is radically 
different in most respects and shows, in comparison to the Maronites how sects can differ while still 
fitting the sectarian picture.  
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Chapter 3 – Greed versus Grievance in Lebanon 
‘Greed versus grievance’ is one of these central debates that that seems to never go away since there 
simply is not a right answer. This chapter will analyse both sides of this debate by using a model that 
speaks for both sides. Just like in the previous chapter, this chapter will serve as a proof of concept. How 
well does the sectarian nature of the civil war in Lebanon transfer to a model? And can it, at least partly, 
be explained in such a way? 
  The instigators of this debate are Collier & Hoeffler with their econometric model which was 
first published in ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’.69 In this article, together with their two volume 
book ‘Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis’, they prove that a civil war is not as 
unpredictable as thought before. By analysing the causes of 79 civil wars between 1960 and 1999, they 
have come to the conclusion that, while grievance is never completely out of the picture, greed is the 
main factor for civil conflict. However, if the grievance variables are significant, these will show up 
perfectly as well.70 The model has ever since achieved an important role among analysis tools for civil 
conflict. The most important aspect of this model, is that it uses both grievance and greed variables to 
come to an understanding. However good their model might be, one of their case studies significantly 
stands out from the rest.  
When Collier & Hoeffler used the data they needed for Lebanon and put them through their 
model it turned out to be unlikely that civil war would break out. Anyone who has remotely studied the 
history of Lebanon however, knows that the region has always been on the brink of civil conflict. In 
‘Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis’ Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka are given the 
honours of explaining why this civil war is different from the others and what alternate explanations 
could provide extra insights.71 It is through them and the results of Collier & Hoeffler themselves that 
we analyse this sectarian conflict. As we have by now established, a sectarian war has to be fought along 
religious lines. The CH-model does put some weight on these factors, but by far the heaviest weight is 
put on economic factors. According to Makdisi & Sadaka, this is one of the reasons Lebanon is, even in 
this research, an outcast.  
To look at how Collier & Hoeffler assess the Lebanese situation an assessment of the pre-war 
conditions needs to be made. Economically, Lebanon seemed to be thriving for a developing country. 
Since their independence of 1943, especially the private sector had developed immensely, mostly due 
to the lack of natural resources in the area. Lebanon was in a free foreign exchange program and, in 
contrast to their neighbours, this allowed the private sector to freely interact with whomever they 
wanted. Lebanon therefor turned into an interesting investing climate. Between 1950 and 1974, the 
average annual growth rate of the Lebanese economy was about 7 percent, while inflation stayed around 
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2% until it increased to about 8% in the early seventies and into the war. With the highest level of per 
capita income ($1.200) in any developing country in 197472 everything seemed to go rather smoothly 
on the economic side. However, 54% of the population was still qualified as poor and 21% was classified 
very rich.73 This is not good, but compared to other developing countries, it is also far from bad. The 
problem in Lebanon then, arises when we look at how the wealth was distributed. Those 21% rich people 
were either living in Beirut, or they were Christian Maronites in the central Mountains. The periphery 
of Beirut, and especially the people living in the south were mainly Shi’a or Druze communities who 
filled the poor class.  
The economic differences are overshadowed however by the political differences. Lebanon’s 
division of politics along sectarian lines meant that a weak government was a given, while corruption 
and clientelism were a necessity to keep the government alive. In ‘exchange’, Lebanon did enjoy regular 
elections, religious freedom and free growth and expression of political parties. Obviously, those parties 
still were divided along sectarian lines and the Christians for example always had a right to 55% of the 
parliamentary seats, but how these seats were filled politically was up for free election. These strains 
only increased when the Muslim population, and the Sunni’s in particular started demanding more equal 
rights, which would also be accompanied by a more equal economic division. To add to these strains, 
were the international crises of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the massive influx of Palestinian refugees.  
As explained in chapter 2, it is along those sectarian lines that the civil war broke out. Collier & 
Hoeffler believe that it is those militias and the way they get funding together that determines the 
intensity and the duration of the conflict.74 In Appendix 2 we see the dominant and minor factions who 
were battling each other during the fifteen years of war. For the major militias, it is known that they set 
up intricate organisations to support their military activities. Large administrative offices and social 
services made it possible for the fighters to earn money. According to Makdisi and Sadaka “a soldier’s 
salary was usually $75–$150 per month, which was higher than the prevailing minimum wage. Low-
ranking officers were paid $170–$200 per month, while higher ranking officers received between $250 
and $400 a month.”75. Since unemployment was high, this wage was very tempting for a lot of men. 
Furthermore, militia’s spent about 60% of their budgets to fighting equipment, with the rest going 
towards ‘information offices’ which under held contact with other militia’s or foreign troops and 
sponsors like the Syrians or the Israeli’s.76 Revenue wise, the Militias managed to amass about $15 
billion US internally and $30 billion externally.77 This simply meant that it was easy to maintain a war 
effort. After the fighting was done, an estimated 144.000 people had died by violence and the economy 
was destroyed, with estimates of costs between 80 and 160 billion US dollars.78 
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 So, we see that with a relatively booming economy, Lebanon still plunged into civil war. 
However, the CH model, calculated that in 1970, the opportunity for war was only 2,6%.79 Since very 
few things changed in Lebanon until the war, it is safe to assume this figure would have been similar for 
1974 when the fighting broke out. Where does this go wrong? Let’s assess the list of variables for the 
CH-model: GDP; Level of Secondary Schooling of Boys; Population Density; Social Cohesion 
(measured mostly by social fractionalization); Primary Commodities; Military Advantage (measured 
mostly by mountainous terrain and population dispersion); Ethnic Hatred; Political Repression; 
Political Exclusion; Economic Inequality and lastly Time Passed since Last Conflict.80 In this model, 
social cohesion, ethnic hatred, political expression and political exclusion for the Grievance side, while 
the others combined form the Greed argument.  
As we by now know, the GDP was high for a developing country, meaning that the probability 
for civil war there was low. The level of schooling was relatively high, meaning the probability was 
low. Population density was low, except for in Beirut, and the general population only counted about 3 
million people.81 Social cohesion is measured mostly by how fractured the society is. It is very apparent 
that the Lebanese society is fractured along thick religious lines. Social fractionalization however, is 
measured by two variables: ethnic and religious fractionalization. Ethnically, Lebanon is one. Even the 
Druze, although originally from a south-west Asian ethnicity, had lived in the Lebanon region for so 
long they did not adhere to ethnic differences. So while ethnographically the fractionalization is almost 
0, the religious one is very high. The CH-model however, as an ‘average’ of all 79 civil wars they 
measured, heavily favours ethnic fractionalization, since that is a far more common problem than a 
purely religious division. In short, although religious differences are high, the numbers for social 
cohesion will be relatively low, meaning once again a low probability for civil war.  
This very same problem shows in the Political Repression, Political Exclusion and the 
Economic Inequality categories, or in other words: the other grievance categories. Both are measured 
along ethnic lines. Politically, every ethnicity is represented greatly, since there are very few different 
ethnicities in Lebanon. So, the odd religiously divided parliament is not taken into consideration. As 
shown before economic inequality was mainly present along sectarian lines, but not if we look at the 
total population. Sure, 54% was still in the poor category, but in relation to other developing countries 
this is very low. After this and Chapter 2, the Ethnic Hatred category speaks for itself; ethnically the 
fighting forces are all the same. Primary Commodities were quite low. Historically silk and tobacco had 
been important to the Lebanese economy, but since its independence Lebanon had seen a big increase 
in its tertiary sector, overtaking the exports of silk and tobacco, which had already been in decline due 
to the independence of other developing countries.82                         v  
  That leaves Military Advantage and Time Passed Since Last Conflict. The mountainous terrain 
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of Lebanon is a benefactor to rebel groups but, the population dispersion is once again measured 
ethnically meaning that military advantage is not high, but not low either. The time passed is measured 
from the last serious internal conflict Lebanon had been in, which was the troubles of 1958 where the 
Americans had to intervene. According to Collier & Hoeffler, this is a long time relatively to the other 
case studies, causing, once again, a low probability rating.   
The strong focus on economies and the way ethnicity is valued over religiosity are paramount 
to the position of Lebanon as an anomaly in Colliers’ & Hoeffler’s results. It is fair to say however, that 
the sectarian division of Lebanon’s society has created as much trouble as similar countries with ethnical 
problems. It is safe to assume that if we replace the ethnic with the religious numbers, the probability 
for civil war would be much greater. So, what we learn is that, if most values relevant to a countries 
stability are in favour of stability except for extreme sectarian division, the CH-model sees little chance 
of a civil war. This does not make the model useless in the slightest. Firstly, it shows how rare a truly 
sectarian civil is. Secondly it shows that if there is a high probability of civil war, there is probably more 
going on than sectarian trouble.                         v 
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Part 3 – Case Study 2: Syria 
In academia some scholars have assumed that if religious violence happens, sectarianism must be the 
root. An example of this is Lawrence G. Potter’s famous book: Sectarian politics in the Middle East. He 
starts his book off with: “By 2013, sectarian conflict had reignited in Iraq and spread to Syria, where 
ruling Alawites were locked in bitter civil war with a Sunni resistance which dragged in the 
neighbouring states of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.”83 A quick internet search shows just how 
widespread this idea is. Thus, what happens is that a lot of research is focussed on solving the sectarian 
crisis in Syria (or Iraq), rather than actually analysing the fundamentals of the ongoing conflict. The 
basic assumption that because ‘people with different (ethno-) religious ideologies are fighting, so we are 
speaking of a sectarian conflict’ is ignorant. Recently, more scholars are agreeing that research on 
‘solving Syria’ should first analyse the assumptions they hold for granted. According to Christopher 
Phillips, this type of research is characterized by three wrong assumptions.84 The first assumption, he 
argues, is that sub-state identities and political alignment based on those identities inherently represent 
a failure of nation building. Secondly, it is wrong to assume that a sect, or a group with sectarian ties, is 
a rigid thing with set believes. In reality, such groups are “ambiguous and fluid”85 and not very cohesive. 
The third wrong assumption is that ethno-sectarian models can solve sectarian violence. The political 
identity of a sect is more complicated than merely a set of religious ideas it wants to portray politically. 
Reducing an entire conflict, like the Syrian one, to sectarianism means one does not only ignore part of 
the reality, but it also plays down the significance of what is happening.                         v 
 Wrong assumptions aside, if this many people claim something sectarian is happening, there 
could also very well be some truth to it. The previous chapter has clearly demonstrated how sectarianism 
can evolve from something as small as a job occupation that is refused by one group but not the other, 
to centuries of quarrels and thousands of deaths. Sectarianism – as hard as it might be to define – is 
therefore not unidentifiable. In order to do this for Syria, this chapter needs to follow a slightly different 
path than Part two. Lebanon’s sectarian groups are characterized by a common history that has made 
them the nation they are today. For Syria, the fighting groups developed mostly linear and while Syria’s 
history is riddled with complications, they have occurred from very different problems.  
Assessing if the Syrian civil war is indeed a sectarian civil war, means making some 
assumptions, namely that if this is a sectarian civil war, we must be able to find an historic basis. After 
all, sectarianism is not something that occurs out of the blue. The next assumption that will be made, is 
that Syria indeed is a country with a sectarian divide. Consequently, this chapter will assess its sectarian 
history, leading up to analysis of who plays a part in this war and how they can be characterized, using 
Berger’s model. Next, this chapter will place those groups and the entire conflict in the Greed and 
Grievance debate to decide if the Syrian civil war should indeed be called an expression of sectarianism. 
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Chapter 1 – Syria’s Fighting Forces 
Lebanon, as the stereotype for sectarianism and consociationalism, has been researched thoroughly on 
the historical roots of its sectarian divide. In stark contrast, Syria’s (recent) history is not known for 
sectarianism at all. Therefore, it would make sense to start off with a historical analysis of the Syrian 
sects. For the current civil war in Syria, this is not as clear-cut. Starting with a historical analysis of 
Syria’s sectarian history means delving through Syria’s entire history and make note of every influential 
religious group that ever settled in the region in the hope that they are still relevant today. Lebanese 
sectarianism has been mapped this way, however, it has not been done for Syria. It surely will in the 
coming years, but as of right now such a history book has yet to be written. Therefore, rather than starting 
off with the history, this chapter first analyses what groups are currently fighting in Syria. That way, the 
historical analysis can be accurate and thorough without beating too much around the bush. 
 So, how is the civil war in Syria currently divided? As can be seen in the picture below, provided 
by Vox86, it is quite messy. Basically, we can identify four fighting sides: the Assad regime, the 
Opposition’s rebels, Islamic State and the Kurds. Generally speaking all fighting sides have found some 
foreign backing87 and, although for example Russia’s support for Assad seems to diminish slightly, these 
all play a part in the war. Assuming Syria’s sectarianism however, the foreign entities played no 
significant part in the sectarian structures that underlay this struggle, much like they did not in Lebanon. 
Therefore, this chapter will focus on the four main groups. 
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§1.1 The Assad Regime 
In 1970 Hafez al-Assad enters office through a rather peaceful coup d’état within the ruling Ba’ath 
party.88 After he died, his son Bashar is elected president and would rule the country until the current 
day. Fouad Ajami, author of ‘The Syrian Rebellion’, ascribes the success of the Assad dynasty to their 
Alawi (also known as Alawite or Nusayri) heritage. Like many other authors, he recognises the Alawite 
come off as one of the most pressing divisionary matters within Syria’s society just before the fateful 
happenings of 2011. While he describes the Assad success to the ‘alawi asabiya’89 the historical 
antagonism between the Sunni cities and the Alawi Mountains cannot be overlooked when talking about 
the sectarian nature of this conflict. Therefore, it makes sense to start the historical analysis in these 
mountains.  
 The Alawite faith is a branched of section of what is generally known as Twelver Shi‘ism, the 
main branch within Shi’a theology.90 While the exact origins of this faith are unknown, it is generally 
believed that Ibn Nusayri – a disciple of the tenth and eleventh Imam – and his followers are the original 
creators of the faith.91 They travelled the Middle East after Nusayr’s excommunication before they 
settled in the mountains of current day Syria, in Aleppo and in Baghdad.92 Their religion stayed 
relatively secret until the twentieth century when researchers slowly started to unravel what being Alawi 
exactly entailed. This secrecy towards outsiders, combined with the general consensus of Alawi’s being 
“extremist exaggerators”93 gave rise to a lot of distrust towards the Alawi people, resulting in the 
Alawi’s keeping to themselves. This exclusion got worse when the famous jurist Ibn Taymiyya (1263-
1328) issued several fatwa’s against the Alawi’s, declaring them “sectarian enemies of Islam”.94 With 
their territories in Aleppo and Baghdad soon gone, the Alawi people retreated to the mountains not to 
return to the public eye until the Mamelukes and later the Ottomans found them during their conquest 
of Syria.  
 During these centuries the Alawi’s would often be the aim of punitive expeditions and 
persecution.95 During the crusades of the eleventh century the Alawi in the Lebanon Mountains helped 
out the Christians, which angered every Muslim community in the region, especially the Ismaili, who 
they had been feuding with for a long time anyway. In 1220, when the Ismaili launched a massive 
operation against the Alawi, the Kurds, who had recently aligned themselves with the Ismaili entered 
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the persecutions as well.96 After this the Kurds and the Alawi had a hard time getting along. However, 
a new thread was on the horizon: The Mongol Horde. The Horde swept through Syria and the Alawi 
were allegedly helping them capture the cities and castles of the north. The Mamelukes, who were 
somewhat understandably furious about this, ordered the Alawi’s to build mosques in every village in 
order for them to return to normal Islam after they had driven the Mongols from the Syrian lands.97 The 
Alawi built the mosques, though as far away from their villages as they could, only to never maintain 
them. Besides the persecutions, several tribes within the Alawi fought each other, leaving anything but 
a united sect behind.98 When the Ottomans found this extraordinary sect in the early sixteenth century 
they nicknamed them ‘The Lost People’ (al-milla al-dhalla)99 and although the Sultan was highly 
suspicious of this extremist Shi’a sect, he left them largely to themselves. Instead, he ordered thousands 
of Shi’a Turks from Khurasan to move into the same mountains and live among the same territories, so 
the Sultan would have eyes and ears in a region where is army was largely powerless.100 The Alawi 
strongholds outside the mountains were captured and any Shi’a left would be killed. In the mountains 
however, the Turks integrated and became part of the sect, rather than eradicating the sect as Sultan 
Selim I had intended.101  
 Plans and persecutions similar to Selim’s were hard to execute, since the inhospitable mountains 
that the Alawi called their home were easy to defend. Therefore, the Ottomans left them largely to 
themselves, only imposing high taxes on them (which were rarely collected) and intervening only when 
there was a serious crime committed. Matti Moosa, author of ‘Extremist Shi’ites: The Ghulat Sects’ 
gives an example of how about 300 Alawi came down from the mountain because they had had a fight 
amongst themselves and had been expelled.102 The Ismaili’s at the foot of the mountains, though 
reluctant, accepted the group in their villages, only to be murdered by the Alawi and a couple of hundred 
of their kinsmen from the mountains a short while later. The Ottoman governor was outraged and 
slaughtered every Alawi they could find in the area.  
 The now well-known Ibrahim Pasha had quite an influence on the Syrian lands. The Alawi, like 
with every ruler before Ibrahim, had problems with him. They refused to disarm so after Ibrahim had 
secured the Alawi castles and villages outside the mountains, he sent Druze (and a few Maronite) forces 
from Lebanon to deal with these annoyances. All 500 of the Druze soldiers were murdered at a place in 
the ‘Wadi al-Uyuu’m’ valley that has be called ‘Blood Rock’ ever since.103 The savage fighting and 
rebellions against not only the government, but also among themselves gave the Alawi the reputation of 
barbaric and ungodly. Public opinion was that no-one in their right minds would try and negotiate with 
these people because they would just cut your head off.  
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 The twentieth century arrived and in 1916 this once again meant a new suzerain. After some 
struggles with self-proclaimed King Faysal and Alawi forces, it was the French who incorporated Syria 
into their vast colonial network. The Alawi supported the French rulers and were paid back for their 
loyalty when the French divided the Syrian region into several ethnic ‘states’ and concluded that the 
Alawi state should be one of them (see Appendix 3). The state contained approximately 370.000 
inhabitants, of which 60% was Alawi, 20% Sunni and the other 20% a mixture of different Shi’a and 
Christian groups.104  Although the state lasted only about fifteen years until the French gave in to a 
central command in Damascus, the French had given the Alawi people a way up.  
At this time the Alawi were very poor. The situation was so dire, that some families even had 
to sell their daughters as servants in order to support the rest of the household.105 Although they had a 
big majority in the region, most of the wealthy people were Sunni and had hired Alawi people to do 
their common jobs. Religiously the Sunni upper class did not bother them, but politically it did.106 Every 
Sunni ruler had tried to eradicate the Alawites, who had no reason to believe the Sunni nationalists in 
Damascus now were any different. However, the new autonomy this state created gave the Alawi a 
renewed sense of community.107 So, when the French gave them the possibility to better their economic 
positions, they seized this opportunity with both hands. Serving in the French army division of Les 
Troupes Spéciales du Levant the poor Alawi sons enjoyed an education and probably due to the heritage 
of the Alawi militaristic nature, quickly grew through the ranks of the army division. Just before the 
outbreak of the Second World War a generation of young, moderate and educated Alawi officers had 
emerged who, in contrast to their hard-line fathers, saw a future in Syrian nationalism.108 However, when 
negotiations with the French to join Lebanon failed near the end of the 1930’s, World War II emerged 
and would ultimately, mean the end of the French mandate over Syria. By 1946, the Alawi Mountains 
were ruled by Sunni Arabs once more.  
 The improved positions of conscripted Alawi men in turn encouraged other Alawi boys to join 
with enthusiasm. The region however, was still poor and a lot of common Alawi families could not 
afford the badal, a sort of army tax to the government. This then led to forced conscription for the boys 
of these families. By the late 1940’s and the 1950’s, Alawi soldiers dominated the army’s officer 
positions although they did not yet occupy the highest positions. From 1949 to 1954, four military coups 
took place, all organized by Sunni Generals or Colonels. These resulted in various cleansings of the 
army ranks, leaving a lot of Alawi officers in place while many Sunni’s who had supported at least one 
of the coups had to make way.109 By 1955, almost 65% of all officers in the Syrian army was Alawi.110 
At the same time, the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) and the Ba’ath Party attracted a large Alawi 
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following because of its positions towards religious minorities. Among them were most of the 
conscripted soldiers. When the SSNP was disbanded by the government, most of their members enlisted 
in the Ba’ath Party. However, when Syria entered the United Arab Republic, the Ba’ath party was 
disbanded too. Consequently, the officers in the army grew wary of Nasser’s influence. During the UAR 
years, a secret military branch of the Ba’ath was established by one Druze (Hamad Ubayd) and three 
Alawi (Hafiz al-Assad, Salah Jadid and Muhammad Umran) army officers. After the fall of the UAR 
and the establishment of Ba’ath rule, this military group assumed complete control over the army, with 
not just the highest officers being either Alawi or Ba’athist, but also with full control over the military 
academies.111Although the 1960’s did bring the Ba’ath party rule over Syria, several attempted (and a 
few successful) coup d’états among their own ranks and from for example Nasserites, meant that power 
was far from being secured yet. During these chaotic years, more and more Alawi members became 
active members of the party.112 Through their influence, the party’s ideals of Arab nationalism slowly 
changed into a focus on regionalism and sectarianism.113 Slowly, the Alawi’s in the Ba’ath Party 
distanced themselves and drew up plans to stage a coup themselves.  
 By 1966, after yet another putsch, Alawi strongmen occupied every major position within the 
Ba’ath party and systematically purged and arrested Sunni, Druze and Shi’a party and army members.  
The disgrace of the 1967 war with Israel reinvigorated and modernized the army, which by 1970 had 
become so powerful that it allowed Hafiz al-Assad to purge his enemies within the party and assume 
complete power over the party and the army. By eliminating his fellow Alawi leaders, he became the 
sole Alawi front runner and in 1971, he became the first ever Alawi president. Hafez managed to 
stabilize Syria’s politics, which had been riddled with coups ever since its independence. He had 
managed to get the Alawi faith declared Islamic by Musa al-Sadr114 and ayatollah Khomeini and 
immediately transformed the Syrian constitution into a much more secular one.115 His secular rule over 
Syria accepted every religious minority (even into government or party positions) and transformed 
Syrian politics into a system where the president always had the last say in things.116 While an Alawite 
elite emerge from Hafez’ rule, his own ruling elite certainly was not sectarian. Among his trustees for 
government were several Sunni figures who played important parts in the everyday rule of the country 
and would do so even when his son took over. Rather than religious or ethnic background, Hafez chose 
people who could help him stay in power. Hafez al-Assad had created a cult of personality (initially 
around himself and later around his entire family) that was solely based on power. The only times 
sectarianism was practised by Hafez was if his own power was threatened. 
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 When Hafez’ son Bashar al-Assad took over the office in 2000 after Hafez’ death, Syria had 
lost a shrewd and strategically strong leader. Bashar, was the general conclusion, had ruined the 
powerful Syria of the second half of the twentieth century. The days that Syria was one of the strong 
holders and frontrunners of the Arab world had gone. Human Rights Watch described Bashar’s first 
decade in power as “a wasted decade”117. Or, as Ajami summarizes Syria’s abysmal position: 
“Unemployment was over 20% and 32% of its people lived below the poverty line. The country ranked 
165th (out of 175 nations) in press freedom, 152nd (out of a sample of 152) on the index of democracy, 
and 19th (out of 22 Arab countries) in economic performance.”118  
 These measures are proof of a totalitarian regime that in spite of everything would do whatever 
it takes to stay in power. Hafez had used the Alawi’s rising position in the army and later in the Ba’ath 
party to better himself and his family. Although he had not been the brain behind the initial rise to power, 
he had profited from these struggles the most. However, these struggles, although the Alawi clearly 
opposed Sunni leaders, had not been sectarian. Their religion did not matter, but their status as a minority 
did. It had helped them gain support from other rural minorities like the Druze, the Kurds and even the 
Ismaili and other Shi’a Muslims. This was not sectarianism; this was minority politics.  
  Bashar on the other hand did not experience this power struggle. He was born when Hafez was 
already high up in the ranks of the army and the Ba’ath party and he was not even trained to rule until 
his brother died in 1994.119 Unaware of the exact kind of support he needed, Bashar alienated most 
minorities from his regime.120 More importantly, the countryside, which had given rise to the Alawi 
regime to begin with, had grown distant to the regime. They did not trust the urbanized ruler in his 
porcelain tower. To Assad however, not just the Sunni, but everyone who tried to take his power away 
was a wrongdoer that should be taken care off. After the initial struggles of the Damascus spring, 
immediately following Bashar’s election, Bashar aligned himself with the extremist Lebanon based Shi’i 
group Hezbollah and its affiliated leaders in Iran.121 These steps, together with the assassination of Sunni 
prime-minister Harari (also a protégé of the Saudi’s in Lebanon) caused significant unrest among the 
Sunni in Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood, sponsored by the Gulf States and the Saudi’s, started creating 
a Sunni versus Regime schism which soon spread among the population. In early 2011, when Tunisian 
president Ben Ali had dissolved his government and the Tahrir-square in Egypt had been occupied by 
protestors, Bashar al-Assad was interviewed by ‘The Wall Street Journal’. When asked whether he was 
concerned for Syria, Bashar answered with the same quote used in the introduction of this paper122, in 
                                                     
117 Human Rights Watch (Organization).,. "A Wasted Decade Human Rights in Syria during Bashar Al-Asad's First Ten Years in Power." 
Human Rights Watch. 
118 Ajami, 65 
119 Andersen, Roy., Seibert, Robert F., Wagner, Jon G.,. Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990. p. 175-176 
120 Ibidem 
121 Nizameddin, Talal.,. "Squaring the Middle East Triangle in Lebanon: Russia and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Nexus." The Slavonic and East 
European Review 86, no. 3 (Jul., 2008): 475-500. 
122 “Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be strongly linked to the beliefs of your people. This is the core issue. When you have 
divergence (…) you will have this vacuum that creates disturbance.” - Solomon, Jar & Spindle, Bill.,. "Syria Strongman: Time for 
'Reform'." The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011. 
 
34 
 
which he claimed that there was no divergence in Syria because he as president was linked to the beliefs 
of his people. Two months later, protesting Syrians were dying because of the differences within Syria’s 
society created by the Assads. 
 
§1.2 Opposition and Rebels 
The year 2011 was an eventful year in the Arab world. While the ‘Arab Spring’ ended in Tunisia, 
protests, which in some cases erupted in fighting, broke out in Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Djibouti, Somalia, 
Sudan, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait, Morocco, Mauritania, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, The 
United Arab Emirates and indeed Syria.123 In other words, almost every member state of the Arab league 
saw protests against the sitting governments, even if they were minor protests like in Saudi Arabia. In 
Syria the protests started on January 26th when a man was assaulted and later arrested by a police officer. 
The protestors demanded that the man were set free.124 A little over a month later, children in the rural 
city of Daraa were arrested and abused because they had written anti-government slogans on walls at a 
few places in the city.125 The first demonstrations were aimed at releasing these children, but soon they 
were aimed at the government, the Ba’ath party and indeed Bashar al-Assad himself. A few days later 
thousands of people were demonstrating the regime all across Syria, from the countryside to Damascus 
itself. Assad set the army on his people and a couple of months later the people started fighting back 
when nonviolent protests proved ineffective. However, soon the Syrian opposition itself fell apart from 
internal disagreements. According to the BBC, at the highpoint so far over a thousand armed opposition 
groups were fighting the regime uncoordinated.126 This gave rise to more extremist groups taking the 
overhand in fighting the Assad regime.  
   
§1.2.1 Recognised Opposition 
In 2013 the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNC) was founded, 
which united individual parties and opposition figures alike. They set aside their political difference so 
they could form an opposition that would be able to topple the Assad regime. The SNC is recognised by 
the UN and most of its members as the official Opposition to Assad and has been in peace talks with 
them since the first Geneva conference held on the topic of solving the Syrian crisis. Their goals can be 
found in Appendix 4. The Free Syrian army, which was established first in July of 2011, is under direct 
command of the SNC as well, but they are one of the many groups recognised by the SNC.127 The SNC 
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states that they are united by three core principles:  inclusivity, accountability and consensus.128 This 
also means that religious convictions, ethnic backgrounds do not matter as long as “all major groups 
and individuals [are] committed to a democratic, inclusive, and pluralistic Syria”. The only thing that 
matters is that Assad is toppled and democracy restored. What they do strongly distance themselves 
from is “acts of extremism committed by terrorist groups”.  
 
§1.2.2 Islamist Opposition 
Besides the SNC, a couple of other groups have allied themselves with the SNC, but they are not 
officially recognised as opposition by anyone else but themselves and have therefor not participated in 
the peace talks that have been held so far. Among them are the Islamic Front, Muslim Brotherhood, and 
the Army of Conquest. All of them propose a Sunni Islamist way of rebuilding Syria. These groups, 
although religiously affiliated, have been fighting extremist groups like IS. In their dedication to 
religious dominance and sectarian division, they have not been able to join the SNC. However, since 
their goals of toppling the regime are similar they are known as an opposition force.  
 Jabhat al-Nusra is an extremist group that is very similar in its goals to IS, as I will explain in 
paragraph 1.3. The al-Nusra front, together with for example the Muslim Brotherhood, have had an 
interesting and sometimes quite long history of Islamism and are perhaps some of the most well-known 
defenders of that political stream. Their sectarian struggle did gain some popularity among the 
population, like it did with other Islamist groups. These groups, however, are also known to fight the 
SNC or even among themselves. The problem is that, according to the Soufan Group, jihadi fighters, 
and especially the foreign ones, only join the most extremist of groups this means that many of them 
end up with IS, and Jabhat al-Nusra, but few affiliate themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood or other 
Islamist groups.129 So while these forces are fanatically fighting Assad, IS and rarely but sometimes the 
SNC, in the end their role in the bigger picture of the civil war is small. These groups then, are but a 
minor voice among the rebellious forces aiming for the toppling of Bashar al-Assad.130 That minor voice 
however, does speak very loud and their sectarian fanaticism has been a major cause for branding the 
Syrian civil war sectarian. 
 
§1.3 Islamic State 
To many, Islamic state (IS, but also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh131) was a completely new and radical 
thing. Reviewing its history and what is currently known, however, shows how IS has been active for 
quite some time in several different ways. Although Abu Bakhr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the caliphate 
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in 2014, the actual origins of IS go back to the late 1990’s. There is a lot of confusion around the subject 
of this extreme Salafi group, but it is safe to assume that out of every group currently fighting in Syria, 
IS is the group with the most sectarian roots.  
 To properly understand this sectarian sect we must go back to 1999. Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-
Jihad (‘Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad’) or JTJ was a newly established jihadist group led by 
the Jordanian Sunni Muslim Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi, disgruntled by how ‘un-Islamic’ his 
home country had become. He had come to Afghanistan in 1999 to fight the Soviets, but after the Soviets 
left al-Zarqawi felt like he had to do something to improve the position of Islam.132 Together with some 
other Jordanian jihadi’s and some money from Osama Bin Laden he started an jihadist training camp 
under the name of his newly established group.133 With the goal of overthrowing the rulers in Jordan 
and later the entire Levant, al-Zarqawi had set a plan in motion that would in the end lead to the self-
proclaimed caliphate we now call Islamic state.134 Apart from some of the more extreme ideas he said, 
like that Shi’ites were to be called with every other faith135, little is known about what else this group 
did in the first few years of its existence.  
 Following the 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden stopped funding to the JTJ training camp and thus, after 
the Americans invaded Afghanistan, al-Zaqawi and his compatriots fled to Baghdad.136 Although his 
group was being hunted by Saddam Hussain’s regime137, the JTJ was allegedly behind violent attacks 
and bombings against Shi’a targets and the assassination of US diplomat Laurence Foley in 2002. In 
2004 the group officially allied itself with Al-Qaida and changed its name to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi 
Bilad al-Rafidayn, better known as ‘al-Qaida in Iraq’ or AQI.138 It was the same year when the United 
States put al-Zarqawi and his group on the international terrorist group list. AQI became the main source 
of fighters and violence for the ‘Iraqi insurgency’ and created a four stage plan that would bring Islam 
back where it belonged.139 First, the UUS forces needed to be expulsed out of Iraq. Then, Iraq needed 
to be re-established as a caliphate. The third step would be to extent its caliphate to all the secular 
neighbouring countries through a ‘jihad wave’. Last, after this big caliphate had been established, a clash 
with Israel was supposed to follow. These years were riddled with kidnappings, bombings and other 
attacks, all aimed at Shi’a or Western targets. In 2006 an US airstrike killed al-Zaqawi and his second 
in command Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman. The new leader, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, then led AQI into a new 
struggle for power. In the fall of 2006 the Islamic state of Iraq (ISI) was founded by six Sunni Arab 
tribes that declared Abu Omar al-Baghdadi its leader. Al-Masri became their Minister of War and with 
                                                     
132 Zelin, Aaron Y.,. "The War between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement." The Washington Institute for 
Near East policy. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-war-between-isis-and-al-qaeda-for-supremacy-of-the-global-
jihadist (accessed 23/02, 2016). 
133 Ibidem 
134 Ibidem 
135 Weaver, Mary Anne.,. the Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The Atlantic, July 2006. 
136 United States., Congress., Senate., Select Committee on Intelligence.,. Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and 
Links to Terrorism and how they Compare with Prewar Assessments : Together with Additional and Minority Views. [Washington, D.C.]: 
[U.S. G.P.O.], 2006. 
137 Ibidem 
138 Rabasa, Angel.,. Beyond Al-Qaeda. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2006. 
139 Whitaker, Brian.,. "Revealed: Al-Qaida Plan to Seize Control of Iraq." The Guardian, October 13, 2005. 
 
37 
 
that AQI gained an important place within this caliphate. After the US increased their troops present in 
Iraq however, AQI and ISI started to lose a lot of fighters and with that a lot of ground. By 2008, as 
Andrew Phillips describes, ISI was in a state of crisis when not only their numbers dwindled, but the 
Sunni community of Iraq turned itself against them.140 
 In 2009 al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed along with about 80% of the ISI members, 
according to American general Ray Odierno.141 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the new leader of a group 
of extremist, but disillusioned people who had lost everything they had once gained. Al-Baghdadi 
breathed new life into the group by introducing former Iraqi Ba’ath party officers into the group. In 
contrast to its Syrian counterpart, the Iraqi Ba’aths under Saddam Hussain were al Sunni, These officers 
were hardened in battle and used to a militaristic regime. Soon they made up about a third off ISI’s top 
25 commanders.142 
 When the protests began in Syria, al-Baghdadi sent Abu Muhammad al-Julani to Syria to set up 
a branch of ISI there.143 Now known as Jabhat al-Nusra, the group grew rapidly and gained a big popular 
support within the Syrian opposition. In 2013, al-Baghdadi declared a merger, which was denied by al-
Julani.144 Al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaida backed al-Julani, but al-Baghdadi was determined to 
establish his caliphate. His subordinations to al-Zawahiri continued and led to a break-up between the 
now called ISIL and al-Qaida. A couple of months later the Eastern controlled regions of al-Nusra 
defected and joined ISIL’s cause. The big difference between al-Nusra and ISIl was that while al-Nusra 
claims to be actively fighting Assad in order for him to leave, ISIL only fights in order to first establish, 
and nowadays enlarge their caliphate. In 2014, the captured territories proclaimed themselves a 
worldwide caliphate with al-Baghdadi as its caliph. They renamed themselves again and turned into 
what is now referred to as IS, ISIS or Daesh.  
 Its aggressive take on jihad, its extremist Salafi interpretation and strong enforcement of Sharia 
law meant that to Salafi’s all around the world this new caliphate was a big attractive force. Foreign 
fighters dominate the caliphate’s ranks and while the fighting on the ground knows its ups and downs, 
their terrorist attacks in both the Middle East and outside of it have had a serious impact on the Western 
perception of Syria, its conflict and its surrounding problems.145   
 
§1.4 The Kurds 
The Kurds are the odd one out in this civil war. Where IS and the Alawi’s call themselves religiously 
different, the Kurds are fighting for ethnological purposes. In this civil war, the Kurds don’t care so 
much what happens to Assad or the Syrian regime, as long as it means independence for their people 
and the formal creation of Kurdistan. Ethnically they are closest related to the Iranians and currently 
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number about 25 million people.146 In Syria around the turn of the century about a million of these lived 
in Syria.147  
  Much like the Alawi, the Kurds have been persecuted or regarded as second rank people for 
ages, the big difference being that Kurds were persecuted for their ethnicity while being Sunni. The first 
time the Kurds come into written view is in 637 when the Arab conquests move towards this region of 
the Middle East.148 Initially the Kurds fought bravely for their Sassanid overlords but when it became 
clear that that empire was failing the Kurdish tribes submitted their loyalty to the Arabs and their new 
religion. Again like the Alawi, the Kurds did not want to be dominated and from their mountainous 
territories they staged several rebellions over the next centuries149, earning them a rebellious reputation, 
but at the same time they were recognized for their excellent military strategy. Soon they would be 
enlisted in the Arab armies where their reputation grew and was solidified when the famous Saladin, a 
born Kurd, established the Ayyubid Empire.  
 While the Arabs left them mostly to themselves, it was the Turks who regularly invaded their 
lands and caused big losses among the Kurdish population. The issues with the Turks would never seize 
and are one of the many fronts in the Syrian conflict we see today. It was however not the Turks, but the 
Mongol Horde that created chaos in the Kurdish lands. During the 13th century Kurdish cities were often 
sacked, burned to ground and discomposed of any living humans.150 This led to a more nomadic lifestyle 
that became dominant among the Kurds for centuries to come. David McDowall, author of ‘A Modern 
History of the Kurds’ argues that rather than an ethnic cleansing, the troubles the Kurdish had gone 
through these six centuries were due to their location. They were on the most important routes between 
East and West, meaning that every army ransacked that region and unfortunately it was the Kurds who 
were living there.151 
 With the sixteenth century came the relative stability after the Ottoman and the Safavid empires 
had settled most of their border disputes that crossed Kurdish lands. For three centuries to come, they 
were relatively left alone and could rebuilt everything they had lost before although the two 
neighbouring superpowers still regularly moved through their lands. To current day Kurds, this was their 
“golden age of independent existence”152. Their entrance into the Ottoman Empire was far from perfect. 
The Kurds enjoyed their tribal freedom while the Ottomans enjoyed order and bureaucracy. A delicate 
system of semi-independence was set in place, mostly due to the Kurdish Sunni faith and military 
brilliance and lasted well into the nineteenth century. It was the nineteenth century however when the 
Kurds started rebelling for their independence again, but also among themselves. A couple of Sheikhs 
had converted to Shi’ism and this caused troubles not only with the Ottomans but with other Kurdish 
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tribal leaders as well. This caused several tribes to declare their independence from the Ottomans or 
continue as vassals to other tribes as can be seen on the map below.153 By 1880, Ottoman and Qajar 
forces combined defeated the rebellious groups and added the territories back to the Ottoman Empire.   
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 Kurdish nationalism (re)emerged when the Ottoman Empire was partitioned after the First 
World War and was mainly a reaction to the secularization and centralization taking place in Turkey.154 
After the Treaty of Sèvres several ethnic-nationalistic groups in the Kurdish lands were convinced they 
could create their own state, but they were blocked by Kemal Atatürk. In 1927 however, backed by the 
UK, they established the republic of Ararat but in 1930 they were beaten and occupied by the Turks. In 
Iraq the Kurds tried to create a state in the 1960’s but this turned into a war with the Iraqi’s.  
  While only a small percentage of the Kurdish population live in Syria, a coalition consisting of 
mostly Kurds, but also a couple of Arabs, Syracs and Turkmen have established the constitution of 
Rojava. Rojava is a region combined of three self-governing cantons in Northern Syria and traditionally 
this area is considered to be part of Kurdistan. This has caused many Kurds from all over the region to 
join the several fighting groups to defend this territory, first and foremost, from IS, but also from 
recapture by the Assad regime. The main group fighting is called the ‘People's Protection Units’ (or 
Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) whose guerrilla like tactics and use of female squads have earned 
themselves a fierce reputation. The main goal for the Rovaja troops are not in the slightest religious, but 
mostly ethnographical in their cause. Their push for independence also meant that they have distanced 
themselves from the opposition forces who seek complete reunification of Syria.                         v 
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Chapter 2 – Sectarian groups in Syria  
The Syrian civil war is a war that consists of many different groups, fighting for many different motives. 
The easiest groups to pick out are the Assad government, the Kurds and Islamic State. The opposition, 
as has been described in chapter 1, is a mixture of groups, but generally we speak of both the official 
recognised opposition and the Islamist opposition. This chapter will apply Berger’s model on the same 
main groups analysed in the previous chapter.  
 
§2.1 – The Assad Regime 
The Assads have grown through the ranks of Syria in its time of turbulence since the independence in 
an astonishing rate. Their backing is mostly Alawi and, people who claim that the Syrian civil war is a 
sectarian civil war also claim that it broke out because of a Sunni discontent with the Alawi rulers. As 
this paper has argued in the previous chapter, my assessment of the conflict is different. In my point of 
view, the Assad clan have used their Alawi heritage to play minority politics to get into power in the 
first place. It had absolutely nothing to do with having Alawi rule over other faiths. However, that does 
not take away the fact that the Assads have that heritage. If we want to assess the sectarian nature of the 
civil war, we have to assess the group that is fighting. That group is the regime and its supporters. This 
regime has an Alawi background, but has tried very hard to be called Shi’ites, rather than Alawi’s 
specifically but only to solidify their political position. Berger argues that a group can only be a sect if 
it is a religious subgroup to begin with. This brings trouble for the regime, since it is a political group, 
which is political in focus, but has a religious heritage. The Alawi faith will be assessed, however, since 
Bashar al-Assads regime is not portraying a religious government, except in their relations with Iran, it 
makes no sense to treat them as a religious subgroup and perhaps a sect.  
 
§2.1.1 Alawi Sectarianism 
 Alawites believe in the absolute oneness of God, who is self-existent and eternal. Like with many other 
Shi’a groups, the Alawites believe that God is undefinable so it makes no sense to attempt to grasp his 
existence, his essence or his attributes. However, when God appeared on Earth, he was never one, but 
three. According to them, God has appeared on earth seven times, but has three personalities, which 
they named ‘Mana’ (Meaning), ‘Ism’ (name) and ‘Bab’ (door). Together, they form the complete 
manifestation of God in the world where the Mana is the causal determinant who is the source and 
meaning of all things. The Ism is created by the Mana and is the way Mana is to be portrayed. The Bab 
is created by the Ism as the explanatory factor and the path that leads to God. As Alawi’s say for short: 
“I turn to the Gate; I bow before the Name; I adore the Meaning"155 His seven manifestations can be 
found in Appendix 5 but to Alawites the last and supreme time God manifested himself (Mana) he did 
it as Ali., with the Ism of the Prophet Muhammad and Salman al-Farsi as the Bab. This holy trinity is 
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there for referred to as AMS. With this system of believe the Alawi underrate the Prophet, while they 
give extra importance to Ali. Unsurprisingly, this has caused tension with especially the Sunnites. But 
the oneness of god is also questionable to many Muslims, causing further alienation from other Muslims.  
 Although their AMS-system is very different, they share a lot of similarities to the Druze faith. 
Just like them, the Alawi believe in metempsychosis, or the transfiguration of the soul, ending with 
reincarnation. In contrast to the Druze however, the Alawi believe in the possibility that a human soul 
can reincarnate into anything, from another human body to plants or even dirt.156 Unbelievers will never 
become human again, while firm believers will enter a body better than their own.  
 This religious motif is obviously very important and is the main reason why the Alawi have 
such a harsh history. Concerning the Conversion category in Berger’s theory, it is clear that the Alawi 
meaning system follows a violently different course from regular Shi’a and Sunni Islam. The way the 
faith is set up, means that perspective and religious experience are aimed towards a different goal: 
reincarnating into a better human body in every way. This heavily influences the Gnosis and Salvation 
categories as well. After all, salvation can only be achieved if you follow the Alawi scriptures and 
teachings, which will help you in being reincarnated into another human. The gnosis’ idea of a super 
cognition, mostly refers to the extreme status of Ali, and the way God has manifested himself on earth. 
Although there are a few Shi’a sects with somewhat similar believes (albeit not this extreme), this is a 
very elite way of looking at God and one that can only be understood if you are part of the groups 
believes. To add to this, the groups Authority rests on exactly that point. You can live outside of the 
Alawi faith. However, if you do, you will not be reincarnated as a human, but rather as an inferior species 
or worse. There is life outside the group, but not salvation.  
 The Catholicism of the Alawi faith is quite similar to most Islamic believe systems. God is one, 
and eternal. The accusations of the divisibility of God as believed by Alawi is mostly cast by Sunni 
criticizers and has always been denied by the Alawi.157 Although God is not in every molecule as for 
example in the Druze faith, the universe can be understood through God and his teachings only.  
 In its Eschatology the Alawi believe not in a mystical and history changing day in the future. 
However, they do believe that one day God will manifest himself once more and it is up to the Alawi to 
find the Bab that leads them there. It is however their past based on especially Ali that sets them apart 
in this category. In the Community category the focus on reincarnation shows that since Alawi’s have 
been around for so long, they are doing something right, since they keep being incarnated. So although 
a community and the way of life might change, the faith, and with that the fate of the world, relies 
heavily on its community. 
 Apologetically the Alawi are not very strong since they rarely try to convince others that their 
believes are wrong. If other believers don’t agree with them, or doubt practises in their religion, they 
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accept that and rare refute them. This is also why they mostly stayed in the mountains. They did not 
care. The Alawi feel that if you doubt their faith, you will pay for it in the next life of your soul. 
Seelsorge-wise, this is somewhat similar. However, according to Moosa the Alawi have quite a few 
written texts by prominent early Nusayrites or for example the Druze.158 These, together of course with 
their prayers and the answers found in the Qur’an and the Hadith, should take care of all the doubts.  
 In short, it is clear that the Alawi faith would qualify for a sectarian group according to Berger’s 
model. They rank highly different from regular faith in every category except for maybe the Seelsorge 
and depending on whose interpretation you ask, Catholicism. Like the Druze in part two, the Alawi form 
a religious and sectarian minority that gives an extraordinary interpretation to the world and how to 
function within that world. The implications for daily life which have been ingrained in Alawi identity 
is that you stay to yourself and protect what is Alawi, but outside of that everyone can do as they see fit. 
If you are a really devout Christian for example, you might reincarnate into a swine and learn your lesson 
that way.159 The same goes for a very religious Jew who might see his soul transcend into the body of a 
monkey. This is in sharp contrast to the Assad regime. They have tried to stay in power through minority 
politics, claimed to be Shi’a rather than Alawi, though never renouncing their heritage. They have not 
stayed true to their Alawite heritage, but only to themselves.  
 
§2.2 – Islamic State 
United States President Barack Obama has called Islamic State ‘un-Islamic’ on multiple occasions.160 
However, Islamic state is arguably the most sectarian component in the Syrian civil war. Although 
chapter 1 has explained its historical roots, its religious motif has mostly been ignored so far. What 
seems clear to me however, is that Obama’s rhetoric is wrong. Islamic State is Islamic and very strictly 
Islamic too. In relation to its history, IS could best be described as an extremist form of Salafism, which 
in itself is an extreme form of Sunni Islam. As the word implies, Salafist ideology entails a wish to go 
back to the times of the Salaf (ancestors). This fundamental ideology states that the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, and immediately after are the best times Islam has ever known. This time is truest to what 
Islam really is supposed to be and can be seen as an eternal model for how every Muslim should want 
to live his life. The Islam as practised by the Salaf (so existing out of the Qur’an, the Hadith and the 
ijma) is all you need. Islamic State is one of the Salafi movements that goes beyond the letter of the 
Qur’an in the strictest sense. They believe that even the most extreme Islamic schools of thought are 
wrong since they are venerating names or persons who are not Allah or the Prophet Muhammad. That 
is also why this paper will refrain from using the term Wahhabism in explain Islamic State’s position 
and believes.                                                                     B 
                                                     
158 Idem, 267-279 
159 Idem, 362-371 
160 Statement by the President on ISIL, September 10, 2014. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-
isil-1)  
 
44 
 
    Anyone who doesn’t follow the most literal interpretation of the Salaf scriptures is, according 
to IS, subject to the practise of takfir (excommunication). When someone is an apostate, the resulting 
punishment is death. This means that the vast amount of Muslims all over the world has been marked 
with a death sentence by IS. And of course the real infidels outside of Islam are not much better off. It 
is not difficult to see why Obama (and indeed a lot of Western Muslim organizations) would call IS anti-
Islamic.  
 As a religious subgroup, Islamic State and their religious motif qualify for Berger’s analysis. 
The interesting thing is that IS does not have a very different idea from mainstream Sunni Islam about 
what God is. It is mainly in the way you practice Islam and how you venerate God. Its position in the 
Conversion category is there for an interesting one. Islamic State is the physical entity that embodies the 
believe in the caliphates of the early period. The religious experiences and perspectives are therefor as 
similar as they think they can make it to that period. Most of the things that have been written about 
Islam are dismissed as wrong or even apostate. In other words, it is a very different religious experience. 
 Out of all the categories in Berger’s theory there is only one that does not substantially 
differentiate IS Salafi’s from regular Sunni Muslims. The Catholicism, or universality of god, is exactly 
the same. They believe in the same divinity of God, the only difference is that IS members will not allow 
the scriptures of anyone who has written on this subject outside the Salaf. Therefore they stick close to 
what they believe is the most literal interpretation, but in this respect that does not change a lot.  
 In contrast, its Gnosis is very different. The truth as the Salafist IS members see it, is one that is 
identical to the early days. Since that perspective is widely different from that of other Muslims, but 
religious people in general, it creates a truth that is only understandable for the Salafist members. They 
have created a geological location where you only belong if you adhere to their superior belief system. 
The Authority this elite holds, reflects on every person, but Muslims especially. Islamic State is 
convinced that Caliph al-Baghdadi is the only true Muslim leader in the world. Thus, every Muslim 
should adhere to his authority, or they will become subject to takfir. This as immediate implications for 
the Community of IS as well. Berger has stated that the community factor is the one that is most 
susceptible to change, but always consists of true followers to the sect. To IS, the community they hold 
authority over needs to change back to how it was and only adhere to God and the Prophet. Only that 
community will unite the Muslims and pave the way for Judgement Day. True Salvation can only be 
achieved through the way of the Salaf. This includes the penalties and rewards as they have been 
written/told and nothing else. This seems quite similar to more mainstream interpretations. However, IS 
attaches more value to Judgement Day in the light of salvation. They, like most Muslims, believe a day 
will come where God files his final judgement over humanity. IS believes that the only people who 
adhere to the Salaf and live in the Caliphate are eligible to pass God’s judgement and thus reach 
salvation.  
 While this day of Judgement sets IS apart concerning its Eschatology, its firm believe in the old 
days are what makes it different completely. It is that historic basis that not only defines the group, but 
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it is supposed to be the group itself. In the Apologetic and Seelsorge categories these ideas are reflected 
as well. Arguments against the Salaf are impossible. The Salaf is always right and if you don’t agree or 
change your ways you need to die. The same can be said for doubt. The mechanism of doubt within 
Islamic State faith is that you can find every answer you need in the scriptures. If Sharia law cannot tell 
you what to do, the Qur’an or the Hadith probably have something on it. There is no other way.  
 After this, it is clear that Islamic State can be viewed as a sect and its resulting violence is clearly 
a result of its religious believes. What is important to note, is that Islamic State is not fighting the Assad 
regime because of religious differences. They believe that a caliphate should exist and Syria and Iraq 
have provided the perfect opportunity for that. So while we can speak of violent sectarianism from IS’ 
side, it is not answered from the regime in a sectarian way, leaving the grounds for a sectarian civil war 
between those two fighting sides precarious.  
 
§2.3 – The Opposition & The Kurds 
As has become clear in chapter 1, the opposition in the Syrian civil war is difficult to define. However, 
has this paper has argued there, there is a distinction to be made between recognized and Islamist 
opposition. This is problematic because half of the opposition is not eligible for further assessment 
through Berger’s model. The SNC is not bound to any religion, but merely against a continuation of 
Syria under the Assad family. They aim at a united Syria not based on anything but democracy. This 
inherently means that the SNC is not sectarian and not fighting for a sectarian or religious cause. That 
leaves the Islamist factions among the opposition. Almost all Islamist factions in the opposition are 
jihadist in nature and, much like IS, want territory to create their own Salafi state. The most significant 
way they differ however, is politically. Where IS has proclaimed their caliphate because they felt like 
they had the manpower and the funds to do it, other factions like Jabhat al-Nusra (known for their 
allegiance to al-Qaida and comparable tactics to IS) and Ahrar al-Sham (the second biggest opposition 
force after the Free Syrian Army) want to clear the Assads first, and then take over Syria to declare an 
Islamist State. While their politics differ, their Salafi convictions are the same as IS’ convictions. So, it 
is fair to state that while the SNC and their immediate allies form no sectarian front, the Islamist side do 
and therefore significantly increase the amount of sectarian violence that is associated with the Syrian 
civil war.  
 After the opposition’s forces, there is still the Kurds fighting in the north of Syria. Are the Kurds 
a sectarian group? Again, we must consider the religiosity of the group fighting. What becomes apparent 
immediately is that the Kurds, while ethnically different from Arabs, generally share their religion. A 
large majority is Sunni Muslim, with the rest divided between Shi’ism, a couple of very small branched 
of sects from Shi’ism and a rest category mainly consisting out of Yazidi’s. While this last group has 
been persecuted a lot by IS, this has mainly happened in the Iraqi based territories of IS. Within Syria, 
only about 70.000 Yazidi’s live and many of them don’t consider themselves Kurdish. Being a Kurd, 
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and fighting for Kurdistan is an ethnic fight and not religious. While their position is important to the 
position of Syria in for example the CH-model, they are not relevant in a sectarian civil war.  
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Chapter 3 – Greed and Grievance in the Syrian Civil War 
Collier & Hoeffler have used the Lebanese civil war in their data set for their initial research on the 
Greed vs. Grievance question. For Syria this is of course not the case since this is a recent conflict. The 
difficulty in determining if Syria’s civil war has been explained largely so far. This chapter will try to 
apply Collier & Hoeffler’s model on greed and grievance in civil wars in a qualitative way. Originally, 
this model is meant as a mixture between quantitative measuring and qualitative data gathering. 
However, as Collier & Hoeffler put it themselves: “[Ethnic and religious] hatreds cannot be quantified, 
they can evidently only occur in societies that are multi-ethnic or multi-religious and so our proxies’ 
measure various dimensions of diversity.”161 Although the sectarian nature of this civil war is still in 
debate, it is important that we do assess it as objectively as possible which can only be done if we accept 
the limitations of the theory we use. For sectarianism, as we have seen in Part 2 of this paper, the 
grievance side of the debate is by far the most important. Additionally, sectarian fractionalization is not 
new, but in the data set Collier & Hoeffler used it is usually paired with ethnic violence. Different 
ethnicities have shown to come with different religious convictions, which has caused a lot of the friction 
in other civil wars. Sectarian wars without ethnic problems, like in Lebanon, show a very slim chance 
of civil war. In other words, the grievance side of this debate is very hard to capture in numbers, 
especially since ethnic and religious fractionalization are usually tied together. This chapter will 
therefore assess the Syrian conflict on a qualitative level, similar to how Makisu & Sadiki have done for 
Lebanon. However, since the Syrian conflict can also be a non-sectarian civil war, it would also be 
wrong to cast aside the greed side of this debate. Since the CH-model measures the chance, or rather, 
the opportunity for civil war, the greed side could still help explain the Syrian conflict. 
 
§3.1 Greed in Syria 
As we have seen before, greed is measured in economic terms and in terms of social opportunities. The 
combination of how well a country is doing economically and what the chances for a population are 
concerning work and education are the focal points. Collier & Hoeffler than add the opportunities for 
rebels to grow to a coherent group and how easy it is for the national army to combat these rebellious 
groups.  
  So how does Syria rate in the greed category? In 2010, Syria had a GDP per capita of $4684, 72 
with a growth rate of 3.23%, while the average growth rate since 2005 had been 4.89%.162 Although the 
growth rates are not bad, the GDP per capita itself was. Based on figures from the World Bank, Syria’s 
GDP was rated sixteenth out of all 22 Arab-league members, only leaving Sudan, Mauritania, Yemen, 
Djibouti, Comoros and Somalia behind them.163 And this is before the civil conflict. Chances of a civil 
war occurring increase when the country’s economy is highly dependent on primary commodities. In 
                                                     
161Collier & Hoeffler, 571 
162 Trading Economics. "Syria GDP Annual Growth Rate." http://www.tradingeconomics.com/syria/gdp-growth-annual. 
163 Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Fact Book: Syria." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.  
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Syria droughts have decreased the share of agriculture to 21%, which is still a lot but not rare in 
developing countries. This is completed by a 27,3% share in the GDP contributed by the industrial 
sector, 92% of which is oil and gas production (25,1% of the total GDP).164 This means that 48,3% of 
Syria’s economy before the war was determent by primary commodities.  
 While the state of the economy is a good predictor for social unrest, there also needs to be ground 
for that unrest to grow. Syria’s population consisted of about 21 million people, of which 65% was under 
35 years of age and 40% even under 15.165 Of the Syrian population, about 20% is unemployed.166 
Interesting enough, the enrolment into secondary education is 72%, which means that Syria has a very 
young but educated population.167 According to Collier & Hoeffler the opportunities for civil war 
increase if a young educated population (especially boys) lives in a country with a bad economy and 
few chances of recovering.  
 When the first rebellious fighting began the battles were mostly fought in the streets and to this 
day that has not changed. While Syria is home to a lot of mountains and desert landscape, these are not 
being used as much as a battlefield, except for the Kurds and IS, who have used the mountains and the 
desert considerably. In turn, this has made it easier for the Syrian army, but also for the foreign entities 
fighting in Syria, to combat the rebels. The way the Kurds fight in the northern part of Syria is a good 
example of how much difficulty armies have when fighting in mountainous terrain. So, while the terrain 
is a plus to increase the odds of civil war in the CH-model, the reality of this multifaceted war is that the 
terrain is less important to the outbreak.  
 What is obvious from the above analysis is that in every category relevant to the Greed side of 
the CH-model, Syria has a higher chance of civil war. Zlatin Mitkov, who has done research on a 
comparison between rebelling countries in the Arab Spring, has made a simplified table for the CH-
model on Syria, Libya and Yemen. He comes to a similar conclusion as can be seen in Appendix 6, 
where Syria scores a ‘yes’ in every category that is relevant for the outbreak of a civil war.  
 
§3.2 Grievance in Syria 
Economically the Syrian civil war could have been expected. However, this still does not rule out 
completely sectarian civil war. In order for that to happen, we must specifically see interesting factors 
on the grievance side of the CH-model. What the Lebanese civil war has shown however, is that in an 
ethnically undivided country, religious fractionalization is hard to notice. So, first it is important to 
distinguish if Syria is an ethnically diverse country. 
 Out of the 21 million people in Syria, 90% is ethnically Arab and 9% Kurdish. The rest of the 
groups are made up by mainly Armenians and Turkomans.168 To put it differently; Syria is ethnically 
                                                     
164 Trading Economics. "Syria GDP Annual Growth Rate." 
165 U.S. Department of State. "Syria (09/08/10)." http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/syria/158703.htm. 
166 Ibidem 
167 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. "Syrian Arab Republic: Education." http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/country-
profile.aspx?code=SYR&regioncode=40525. 
168 U.S. Department of State. "Syria (09/08/10). 
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very homogeneous so in the CH-model grievance will be undervalued compared to the greed side. The 
religious divide in Syria is more diverse: Sunni Muslims constitute 74%, Alawis 12%, Christians 10%, 
and the Druze 3% . The remaining 1% is made up of other small Muslim sects, Yazidis and Jews.169 As 
we know, the Alawi’s, under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad and his father before him, have total 
authoritarian control over the country. This means that it is safe to say that Syria shows a large figure in 
Political Exclusion. While Assad has given a few positions to loyal Sunni party members, proving that 
it is not impossible, all the main positions have been filled by Alawi’s. This is common for an 
authoritarian regime. If we look at the Ba’ath party in Iraq under Saddam Hussain’s regime, we see a 
Sunni majority assume power and rule for decades.  
If we consider Political Repression, we have to consider Syria’s parliament. It consists entirely 
of parties approved by the regime. In other words, if the regime does not agree with you party, you will 
not be able to run in the elections. In this sense, Syrian politics is heavily repressed. The parties that 
have been repressed however, are parties that don’t agree with the regime, but this is not necessarily 
reflected in their religious conviction. The Assads have repressed and excluded everyone who does not 
see eye to eye with the regime. This includes Sunni people, but also Alawi’s, as is for example apparent 
in Hafez’ rise to power.  
 If we compare these results to the Lebanese build up to civil war, a completely different picture 
arises. In Lebanon, political exclusion and repression were limited because of the sectarian division their 
society had established. While the role of president was assured to be a Maronite Christian, who it would 
be exactly was up for free elections. In Syria however, there were no free elections. There was no one 
to choose from and the opposition which consisted out of every religion, was still a puppet of the Assads. 
The Lebanese struggles grew from the political differences that grew from the ingrained sectarian 
divisions, while the Syrian problems grew out of agitation with an authoritarian ruler. If we broaden the 
context out of just the grievance side, the influence of the sectarian problems in Lebanon grows even 
stronger. Economically Lebanon was not the strongest, but it wasn’t doing badly either. It was the 
economic inequality that had grown along sectarian lines, combined with those same problems but 
politically, that lit the fuse. In Syria, economic inequality was an issue too. However, rather than 
developing along sectarian lines, only the regime or people affiliated with them got richer, while the 
common man, Sunni, Alawi or whatever religious conviction they held, was struggling to stay afloat. If 
we combine this to the already bad and still deteriorating economy of Syria, civil war seems to have 
been inevitable without a religious divide.  
 
                                                     
169 Ibidem 
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Conclusion 
According to a combined envoy of the United Nations and the Arab League, an estimated 400.000 
people have been killed in the Syrian civil war as of April 2016.170 On top of that, the latest figures show 
that about 4,8 million Syrians have fled the country.171 These numbers staggering and reflect how 
important it is to properly understand this conflict. After all, there is no solving this conflict without 
proper understanding. This research paper has attempted to find an answer to the question “To what 
extend can the ongoing Syrian civil war be identified as a sectarian conflict?”  
 If we look at this conflict, it is easy to see the sectarian problems Syria faces. Islamic State is 
the embodiment of an extremist sect which has found a way to crystalize its believe set. IS’ propaganda 
machine and its violent attacks not just in Syria or the Levant, but in Europe and Asia as well, have 
painted an ineffaceable picture of the conflict. People who have read more about Syria know about the 
Assad Alawi heritage and the struggle the people of his faith have been through. Adding these up then 
suggests that the Syrian civil war is indeed sectarian. These people however, would be wrong. If we 
look at the start of this conflict back in 2011, we see demonstrations and rally’s against Bashar al-Assad. 
No-one mentioned his religion, but it is his authoritarian rule that is the subject of protests. Like many 
other places during the ‘Arab Spring’, people wanted honest and democratic governments and not a 
dictator. In Syria, these protests escalated and an armed opposition took it upon themselves to oust 
Assad. In the wake of this, extremist Salafi’s, some under the flag of IS, some for groups like Jabhat al-
Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, chose to fight for their own cause. This cause is sectarian in nature indeed. 
As this paper has proven, these groups are heavily sectarian, in the sense that while their believe system 
stems from a mainstream religion, its system of meaning shows a radically and violently different 
approach.  
Compared to these sects, the fighting groups in Lebanon during the 1975-1990 civil war there 
are mild. It is in Lebanon, where we see sectarian violence erupt not as an opportunity within an already 
established conflict, but as the conflict itself. The very core of the Lebanese civil war was about sectarian 
dominance, tracing back hundreds of years. These clashes were not ethnic or economic. The political 
and economic difference that had occurred were all a result of centuries of ingrained religious division. 
That is also the reason the Lebanese civil war is a case of its own, even among other civil wars. Unlike 
Lebanon, Syria had a deteriorating bad economy. The old days where Syria was one of the strong holders 
of the Arab world have long gone. In the meantime however, the Assad’s and their immediate following 
have done really well for themselves. The Alawi community itself is wealthier than they were before, 
but even they do not agree with the Assad regime. During Ibrahim Pasha’s rule over Syria, he had tried 
to kill them by sending 500 Druze soldiers to the Wadi al-Uyuu’m valley where all 500 soldiers would 
come to die. In 2012 Assad send his troops to secure the valley. The troops were met with the same 
                                                     
170 Aljazeera. "Syria Death Toll: UN Envoy Estimates 400,000 Killed." Aljazeera, April 23, 2016. 
171 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "Syrian Regional Refugee 
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violence they encountered in FSA controlled regions. The Assad regime might be Alawi in name, but it 
is by no means fighting an Alawi cause. The Assad regime is fighting for the Assad cause and, as we 
have seen in part three, civil war in Syria was probable anyhow. The revolts following the Arab spring 
lit the fuse and a political civil war ensued. The Kurds in the north, much like IS, saw an opportunity to 
free themselves of the yoke they had carried for centuries. Economic troubles and political 
disgruntlement are the basis for what happened to Syria.   
 While calling the Syrian civil war a sectarian conflict might be wrong, it doesn’t mean IS and 
other Salafi groups are not relevant. These groups have brought different and sectarian dimensions to 
this war. Consequently, these can only be dealt with in a sectarian manner, which is the biggest issue 
facing Syrians and the international community today. To add to this sectarian nature, is the alleged 
proxy-war between Sunni Saudi Arabia who support some of the Islamist groups in the opposition and 
Shi’a Iran who have been known to fund the Assads. Although this power play might be an issue in 
Syria, it does not make the Syrian conflict in its core a sectarian conflict. The funding does not turn 
Assad into a Shi’ite or Alawi sect member who fights for that cause, nor does it change anything in the 
attitude or the nature of the Islamist opposition. The nature of the Syrian civil war is not different from 
dozens of civil wars that have gone before them. An authoritarian ruler has triggered his population by 
political and economic repression. That mainly foreign extremist sect members have seized the 
opportunity for themselves is in no way a direct consequence of the underlying troubles in this civil war.   
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Hạrb, Antẉān Khūrī.,. The Maronites : History and Constants. [Beirut, Lebanon]: "The Maronite 
Heritage", 2001. 
Hazran, Yusri.,. The Druze Community and the Lebanese State : Between Confrontation and 
Reconciliation 2014. 
Higgins, G. and John D. Brewer.,. "The Roots of Sectarianism in Northern Ireland." 
Hinnebusch, Raymond,. Syria, Revolution from Above. London; New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Hubbard, Ben & Schmitt, Eric. "Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS." New 
York Times, August 27, 2014. 
Human Rights Watch (Organization).,. "A Wasted Decade Human Rights in Syria during Bashar Al-
Asad's First Ten Years in Power." Human Rights Watch. 
Ibish, Hussein.,. "Is This the End of the Failed Muslim Brotherhood Project?." The National, October 
5, 2013. 
International Business Publications, USA,. Syria Country Study Guide. Volume 1, Volume 1, 2015. 
Jenkins, Brian Michael,., RAND Corporation.,. The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War 2014. 
Kingston, Paul W. T.,. "Reproducing Sectarianism Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil 
Society in Postwar Lebanon. " State University of New York Press. 
Kurdish principalities 
(http://www.institutkurde.org/images/cartes_and_maps/kurdish_independent_kingdom.jpg)  
Lister, Charles R. 2016. The Syrian jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the evolution of an 
insurgency. 
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Appendix 2 
Militia’s in the Lebanese civil war.172  
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Appendix 3 
Map of the French partition of Syria.173  
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Appendix 4 
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NSC) Goals and statements.  
 
Mission Statement: 
Because of the deep crisis in Syria, our country, and the struggle our people are facing, all political 
opposition factions and have come together in unity with the goal of overthrowing the Assad regime, 
ending the suffering of the Syrian people, and to make the transition towards a free and democratic 
country. This coalition will comprise of leadership that will mobilize efforts to support and strengthen 
our people and represent the goals of this revolution in the best way possible. The coalition will do 
everything in its power to reach the goal of overthrowing the Assad regime and bring victory to the 
revolution both inside and outside of Syria. In the period leading to the formation of the coalition, 
many oppositional groups and members, as well as politicians, met to discuss options and ways to 
unify the effort. These discussions were well received on the international platform. These meetings 
culminated during a three -day period in Doha beginning on November 8th, 2012, which resulted in an 
agreement between the oppositional groups and the Syrian National Council to establish “The 
National Syrian Coalition”. 
 
Goals: 
The goal of the National Syrian Coalition are to establish an executive branch that will carry out the 
following goals: 
 To unify support for the joint leadership of the military council, the revolutionary council, and 
the FSA (Free Syrian Army) 
 To generate a fund to support the Syrian people through international coordination 
 To create a Syrian National Legal Committee 
 To establish a transitional government after receiving international recognition 
 
 
http://en.etilaf.org/about-us/goals.html  
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Appendix 5 
Manifestations of God 
Mana Ism Bab 
Abel Adam Gabriel 
Seth Noah Yail Ibn Fatin 
Joseph  Jacob Ham Ibn Kush 
Joshua Moses Dan Ibn Usbaut 
Asaf Solomon Abd Allah Ibn Siman 
Simon Peter Jesus Rawzaba Ibn al-Marzuban 
Ali Muhammad Salman al-Farsi 
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Appendix 6 
 
 
 
